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Abstract 
 
Trust links ordinary citizens to the institutions that are intended to represent them, and thereby 
enhancing both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of democratic government (Bianco 1994; 
Gamson 1968; Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Hetherington 1998). It is therefore an essential 
part of a democratic system. People have confidence in their leaders when the government is 
working well, and absence of political confidence could threaten the system’s legitimacy. 
Mistrust by the citizens is often expressed as an unwillingness to follow political outcomes, 
which prevents progress from happening in the political process (Norris 1999). In this thesis I 
investigate whether economic performance affects political trust, and if the 2008 financial 
crisis has decreased confidence levels due to the severity of its consequences. By using 
multilevel modeling to analyze data from 25 European countries, I find that economic 
performance is an important component in levels of trust. I am also able to conclude that the 
financial crisis has reduced citizen’s trust in political institutions in the countries where the 
crisis has had a severe impact on the economy. As much research emphasizes the importance 
of individual perception of economic performance, this has also been tested for. The results 
indicate that individual perception of the economic situation, influence trust just as much, if 
not more, than the actual economic situation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The bankruptcy of the investment bank, Lehman Brothers, in the fall of 2008 marks the 
beginning of the financial crisis. Due to increased financial globalization, a crisis that started 
with a collapse of the U.S. housing market soon spread to the rest of the world, including 
Europe. The crisis resulted in negative economic growth, high levels of unemployment and 
weak macroeconomic future prospects. Today a number of European countries are in a 
troubling economic situation (Krugman 2012).  
 For years, Europe has been in an economic crisis and the frustration amongst the 
citizens is rising. As the European countries have responded to the crisis with austerity policies, 
thousands of people have hit the streets and demonstrated against their governments. Greece is 
one of the counties that has been affected the worst. In 2010, the Guardian wrote: “Athens 
burns – and crisis strikes at heart of the EU” (Smith 2010), illustrating the frustration and the 
severity of these demonstrations. Also, The Economist wrote on the November 8th that: 
 
Greece faced massive strikes turned riots yesterday as its government passed a new round 
of fiscal consolidation, designed to shrink the budget €18.5 billion by 2016. The contents of 
the austerity plan hardly seems like the stuff to drive Greeks to firebomb riot police; among 
the measures under debate were a two-year rise in the retirement age and measures to make 
it easier to fire public employees. One suspects the anger is only slightly about the day's 
legislation. Rather the tension is probably best explained by the continuing pressure on an 
imploding Greek economy (The Economist 2012). 
 
The crisis has caused millions of people to lose their jobs, and it has set the world economy 
back years (Krugman 2009). Economies go through fluctuations in the short run, but often 
return to normal in the medium run. An adverse shock may lead to a recession, but fairly 
quickly, the economy turns around and returns to its natural level. Most of the time this is what 
happens, but once in a while things do not return to normal. Output remains far below its 
natural level for many years and unemployment remains stubbornly high. Simply put, the 
economy appears to be stuck, unable to return to normal. The most infamous case is the Great 
Depression, which affected most of the world from the late 1920’s to the start of World War II 
(Blanchard 2006). Today, the current crisis is often being referred to as the Great Recession 
and in some places it is so severe that it may even be compared to the Great Depression.  
 In this thesis I set out to disclose both the relationship between economic performance 
and political trust, as well as the financial crisis effect on levels of trust. Several studies on how 
economic performance affects levels of political trust have focused on economic performance 
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in general. However, several researchers have stressed that economic performance might have a 
different effect in a crisis, compared to a non-crisis state. My contribution will be to test how an 
economic crisis, the financial crisis in this case, affects levels of political trust. The goal with 
my thesis is to add to the field of political trust, by examining how macroeconomic indicators, 
which will be affected by the financial crisis, impacts people’s trust in political institutions. The 
financial crisis has not been felt to the same degree in all European countries, and by using 
macroeconomic indicators as measures on the economic crisis, I find the effects of the crisis in 
different economic conditions and economic shocks. 
 What makes economic performance important to levels of trust? And why are high 
levels of trust important? People trust governments more if they have shown a capacity to 
generate economic growth, create jobs, provide access to social services and perform in a 
transparent manner (Fiorina 1978; Mackuen, Erikson and Stimson 1992). If there is any doubt 
that the authorities are capable of managing the national economy and respond to the 
challenges of an economic crisis, it may create mistrust. Because political trust is essential for 
the stability of democracy and a basic prerequisite for the legitimacy of those entrusted with 
political power, it is important that levels of trust does not go down (Hardin 1998; Levi 1998). 
High political trust signals that the institutions function properly and effectively, and helps to 
keep democracy alive (Listhaug and Ringdal 2008).   
 While several studies have investigated the nature of, and variation in individuals’ 
political trust (e.g., Dalton 2004; Levi 1998; Miller and Listhaug 1999; Newton 2008; Norris 
1999; Uslaner 2002), my interest will mainly be in political trust shared by the population of a 
given country. As will be discussed later, most of the variation in political trust and attitudes in 
general, is between individuals. This makes it important to control for measures that may affect 
levels of trust individually. To avoid making wrongful conclusions, I therefore include as many 
relevant individual variables as possible.   
 The data used are from European Social Survey for 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. 
Between the collection of the 2008 and 2010 rounds,1 the financial crisis had made a global 
impact, which makes the, 2010 data of ESS is advantageous. It should however, be mentioned 
that much previous research find that political trust has been decreasing for some time (Dalton 
2004; Obrestad 2009). Round 2004 and 2006 is included to reduce the possibility that the 
evidence found in this analysis only is a continuation or exacerbation of an earlier trend. The 
method employed is a multilevel regression analysis with three levels; individual, country-year, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As can bee seen in Appendix A, Table 1, the 2008 data was collected at the end of 2008 and in 2009 for most 
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and country. To measure economic performance the indicators used are GDP growth rate, GDP 
per capita, Unemployment rate, and gross debt in percent of GDP.  
 
Figure 1: Theoretical model of the expected causal relationship 
 
The figure above illustrates the expected causal relationship. I assume that as a consequence of 
the financial crisis, the macroeconomic measures will have changed in negative direction, 
which again will lower citizen’s trust in political institutions. The financial crisis is viewed as a 
natural experiment in which September 15th 2008, and the following repercussions, represents a 
shock in the equilibrium of political trust in capitalistic states around the world. Therefore, it 
can be argued that the negative fall in confidence after 2008 can be attributed to the financial 
crisis.  
 The included economic indicators are used to describe the economic condition in a 
country. I assume that as a consequence of an economic crisis, the economic measures growth, 
GDP, debt and level of unemployment will be affected. As a consequence, political trust among 
the citizens is affected and assumed reduced. In the period between 2008 and 2010, these 
indicators have changed considerably. Many countries have experienced an increase in 
unemployment, which also can be problematic in a recession. All of the countries have 
experienced a decreased growth, as well as a lower level of GDP. The crisis that started in 2008 
is the worst since the Great Depression in the 1930’s, and will have repercussions for a long 
time (Hilsenrath, Ng, and Damian 2008).  
 The findings suggest, first of all, that economic performance does impact levels of trust. 
I find this when testing the correlations between degree of unemployment, debt, growth and 
GDP, and political trust. A country’s level on all of these indicators, except debt, does affect 
citizen’s confidence. Second, I wanted to find out how the finical crisis has impacted levels of 
trust. To this question, I find that, in the countries severely affected by the financial crisis, it has 
Economic Crisis	

Unemployment 	

GDP Growth	

GDP Per Capita	

GDP Gross Debt	

Political Trust	
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led to a decline in political trust. If the results are due to the actual increase/or decrease in the 
macroeconomic indicators used, or because of the way the policy-makers have handled the 
crisis, is not possible to answer with absolute certainty. However, if a decline is a consequence 
of the indicators used or austerity measures, it is still a consequence of the crisis.  
 Today, in 2013, several years after the crisis started, many Europeans are unemployed 
or underemployed. At recent rates of reaction, we will, according to Krugman (2012), not be 
back to normal levels of employment until around 2020. It is therefore important that policy-
makers realize that the financial crisis may not only inflict serious economic consequences, but 
also possible political costs, as a result of the way the crisis has been handled.  
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2. Theory and previous research on political trust 
 
In this chapter I first define the concept of political trust. This is important because trust is a 
multi-dimensional phenomenon, and a concretization of how trust is defined in this context is 
regarded as necessary. Next, the importance of political trust is discussed. In section 2.3 I look 
at trends in political trust, and study the sample of countries to look for indications of a possible 
negative trend. In section 2.4, I discuss the relationship between political trust and economic 
performance. Section 2.5 deals with the causes and consequences of the financial crisis. In the 
last subsection, I look at the importance of the macroeconomic indicators, and how they have 
changed as a consequence of the crisis.  
2.1 Defining political trust 
The concept of political support is multidimensional, and different terms are often used to 
describe the same phenomenon. Norris (1999) uses the notation support. In this thesis I mostly 
employ the terms trust or political trust, but support and confidence will also be used. Political 
trust can be divided into three forms: thick, interpersonal and systemic or institutional trust 
(Levi 1998; Newton 2001). In this study I am concerned with the third form of trust, because 
this part of the phenomenon is connected to political institutions. Hardin (1998) problematize if 
it is possible to generalize and apply psychological and normative individual behavior to 
institutional behavior. Trust in institutions and trust in other individuals is thus not the same:  
 
My conclusion will be that a claim that one trust government is not closely 
analogous to a claim that one trusts another person. One might still wish to say 
that a citizen can trust government, but this “trust” is different from the trust that 
I might have in you. The seeming goodness and importance of ordinary 
interpersonal trust does not clearly transfer to any nonanalogous notion of trust 
in government (Hardin 1998: 10). 
 
If trust does not generalize to institutions, it is of limited interest in political theory. A common 
understanding is that interest does not transfer from individual to group or national levels. He 
states that it should not be surprising to find that trust, which is often an issue just because 
interests are at stake, does not generalize either. Nevertheless, the encapsulated-interest 
conception of trust can be generalized to fit institutions. In actual life we might not trust an 
institution, but depend on its apparent predictability from its past behavior. Then, we might 
have an expectation of the organizations behavior (Hardin 1998: 152f).  
 Another way of dividing the different levels of trust hails from Easton (1965, 1975). He 
draws a valuable distinction between support for the political community, regime, and 
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authorities. Building upon this foundation, Norris (1999) classifies trust in a hierarchy that 
ranges from specific to general. Norris’ fivefold conceptualization draws a line between 
political actors, regime institutions, regime performance, regime principles, and political 
community. Political community is the most diffuse level while Political actors is the most 
concrete.   
 
Figure 2: Operationalization of Political Trust using Norris (1999) definition. 
Diffuse support  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specific support 
  
  The first level, political community, concerns support which is usually understood as a 
basic attachment to the nation beyond the present institutions of government and the general 
willingness to cooperate together politically. The next level refers to support for the core 
regime principles representing the values of the political system. In a democratic state, which 
all the sample countries are defined as, this dimension refers to “idealist” definitions of 
democracy, derived from classical liberal theory. Since democracy remains an essentially 
Political Community	

Regime Principles	

Regime Performance	

Regime Institutions	

Trust in Political Parties	

Trust in Country's 
Parliament 	

Political  Actors	
 Trust in Politicians	

Political Trust	
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contested concept, open to multiple meanings, there is no consensus about which values should 
be nominated as the most important.  
 Nevertheless, the basic principles of democratic regimes are commonly understood to 
include values such as freedom, participation, tolerance and moderation, respect for legal-
institutional rights and the rule of law (Norris 1999: 11). The third level concerns evaluations 
of regime performance, meaning support for how authoritarian or democratic political 
systems function in practice. This “middle level” of support which is often difficult to grasp, 
is often measured with how satisfied the respondents are with the state of the democracy in 
the country. The fourth level, regime institutions, includes attitudes toward governments, 
parliaments, the executives, the legal system and the police force, the state bureaucracy, 
political parties, and the military. This level is good to measure generalized support for 
institutions and political parties. The last level focuses on trust towards particular party 
leaders or politicians. The last two levels can be hard to distinguish because the dividing line 
between the office and incumbents is often fuzzy (Norris 1999: 12). 
 The dependent variable in my study includes regime institutions with the measures 
TRUST IN COUNTRIES PARLIAMENT and TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES and political actors in 
the form of TRUST IN POLITICIANS. I have chosen to measure the two most specific levels of 
trust, because these two are the levels that most likely would have been affected by the 
economic crisis. Listhaug and Ringdal (2008: 134) state “For established democracies it might 
be more meaningful to compare trust levels in the medium and lower levels of the trust 
hierarchy, like confidence in institutions and trust in politicians.” Also, Both Easton (1965) and 
Norris (1999) find evidence suggesting that economic crises or political shifts are only 
temporary events, that affect trust in political incumbents deeper than confidence in the whole 
political system. 
2.2 The importance of political trust 
Democracy thrives on popular support and withers in its absence (Easton 1965). Political trust 
is essential for the stability of democracy, and a basic prerequisite for the legitimacy of those 
entrusted with political power (Hardin 1998; Levi 1998). Levi (1998) argues that citizens are 
more likely to comply with norms if they perceive the government as credible. Thus, in order to 
produce and achieve political outcomes, it is important that trust is present. A decline in 
confidence can have negative consequences for democracy and the political institutions. High 
political trust signals that the institutions function properly and effectively, and helps to keep 
democracy alive (Listhaug and Ringdal 2008). It also facilitates social and economic exchange 
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and reduces transaction costs in markets. Trust reduces the need for control and supervision, 
which saves money for the government as well as for firms and other actors in the private 
sector. This indicates that countries with high levels of trust will have an advantage in attracting 
investments, trade and tourism, compared to countries with low levels of political trust.  
 Listhaug and Ringdal (2008: 131) view political trust as a success criterion for societies. 
A more general argumentation claims that with the absence of trust in political institutions, the 
legitimacy of those institutions is endangered (Kaltenthaler, Anderson and Miller 2010), and 
citizens undermining the authority of those institutions become more likely (Roth et.al 2011). 
Without sufficient trust, citizens might begin to undermine the authority of the policy-making 
institutions, which might ultimately lead to an abolition of it (Kaltenthaler et al. 2010). Or as 
John Locke (1690) put it “…the ground for trusting rulers are to be found in the sanctions that 
punish breaches of trust”. Without sufficient levels of trust citizens may try to hold back tax 
money, the overall compliance with law will decrease, and young talented graduates may not 
be willing to work for governmental institutions (Nye 1997). This implies that it would be 
dangerous if large numbers of citizens started to distrust the political institutions in their 
country (Kaltenthaler et al. 2010).  
2.3 Political trust: Trends and comparisons 
Politicians often speak of a crisis in democracy due to constantly declining trust in government. 
However, it is not certain whether empirical facts support this conclusion (Norris 1999). Are 
there legitimate grounds for the concern about the declining public support for representative 
democracies worldwide? And what constitutes a worrying decline in political trust? According 
to Newton (2001: 205) an abrupt or steady decline of trust from the long-term trends should be 
regarded as worrying (Newton 2001: 205). Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) find that the trust in 
government and political institutions has been falling in advanced industrialized democracies 
since the late 1960s. They also show that in industrialized democracies trust in political parties 
is eroding. Related to this, public confidence in parliaments has similarly decreased in the last 
decade (Dalton 2004). The European Science Foundation concluded in 1995, in the large 
Beliefs in Government project (BIG), that there was no general decline in political trust in 
Western Europe (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995). Norris (1999) extended this research past the 
mid 1990’s and expanded the data to cover non-Western countries as well. According to this 
research citizens remained committed to the values of democracy. Dalton (2004) demonstrates 
that political trust in advanced industrial countries is declining. Klingemann (1999) finds that 
support for democratic ideals and principles are robust in all parts of the world, but the support 
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is somewhat stronger in Western Europe.2 According to Listhaug and Aardal (2003), levels of 
support are higher in stable democracies compared to new democracies.3     
 However, research that rejects the hypothesis of a universal decline of trust in the public 
sector also exists (Van de Walle, Van Roosbroek, and Bouckaert 2008). They argue that there 
is little evidence of an overall long-term decline in trust in government, and that there are 
fluctuations rather than a stable trend. McAllister’s (1999) research suggests that there are few 
consistent trends in popular support for the political community, but high and perhaps even 
growing support for democratic values. His research also indicates declining support for regime 
institutions and political leaders. This indicates that there might be a negative trend in the more 
specific levels of trust, like political trust, but not necessary a decline in the diffuse levels, like 
regime principles and democratic values. Therefore, it makes sense to limit the research area to 
the more specific levels of trust, which is what I have chosen to do in this thesis.  
 Table 1 show the mean values of political trust in the sample countries in 2004, 2006, 
2008, and 2010. Political trust is combined from the three measures TRUST IN COUNTRIES 
PARLIAMENT, TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES, and TRUST IN POLITICIANS.4  In order to control 
for a possible declining trend in political trust, I have also included the 2002 and 2004 
European Social Surveys. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Klingemann used Values survey data from 1995 to 1997 (Klingemann 1999) 
3 They classified countries in three groups (stable democracies, new democracies and transitional democracies), 
and compared the countries in five dimensions of political trust: how the current system is rated compared to the 
communist regime, satisfaction with how democracy is developing, rejection of non-democratic forms of 
government, rejection of criticism of democracy, and support for democracy as a principle. 
4 For more on the scale construction see section 3.2. 
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Table 1: Political trust – average trend5 
 
2004 2006 2008 2010 
Belgium 13,2 13,7 12,6 12,2 
Bulgaria - 5,6 5,1 6,4 
Switzerland 14,8 15,3 15,2 15,6 
Cyprus - 14,2 14,1 11,7 
Czech Republic 8,5 - 8,6 8,6 
Germany 10,4 10,5 11,5 10,7 
Denmark 17,6 17,7 17,8 16,1 
Estonia 10,5 11,5 10,4 11,3 
Spain 12,5 12,0 11,7 9,8 
Finland 15,9 15,9 15,8 14,4 
France 11,2 10,8 11,3 10,4 
United Kingdom 11,3 11,0 11,4 10,9 
Greece 11,9 - 8,5 4,8 
Croatia - - 7,4 5,6 
Hungary 9,1 8,5 6,5 10,5 
Ireland 12,8 12,5 10,3 9,7 
Netherlands 14,0 15,4 15,8 15,8 
Norway 14,0 14,6 15,2 15,9 
Poland 6,2 6,9 7,6 8,6 
Portugal 7,9 9,0 8,4 7,0 
Russia - 8,9 10,4 9,7 
Sweden 13,9 14,7 15,2 16,5 
Slovenia 10,4 10,7 11,3 7,5 
Slovakia 8,2 11,4 11,5 9,1 
Ukraine 11,1 6,5 4,5 5,9 
Numbers marked in red, are countries that have experienced 
reduced political trust between 2008 and 2010. In columns 
without values the countries haven’t taken part in the survey. 
 
The table shows that 15 out of the 25 countries in the sample have experienced decreased trust 
between 2008 and 2010. Eight countries are experiencing increased trust, while two countries 
have the same levels of trust. Out of the 15 countries experiencing a decrease in trust, it is just 
Cyprus, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Greece, Croatia, Ireland, and Slovenia that one can argue 
have had an abrupt decrease after the financial crisis. In Belgium, a small decline in trust has 
been evident for each year the survey has been conducted. However, the decline from the 
before and after measures, are not severe enough for it to be argued that the decline steams 
from the financial crisis. In Germany, France, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, and the United 
Kingdom, trust has both decreased and increased through each survey-year. Therefore, it is also 
difficult to argue that the decrease in these countries is a consequence of the financial crisis.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  For graphical presentation of trends in political trust, see Figures A1 through A5 in the Appendix.	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Figure 3: Trend in political trust – all countries combined 
 
Political trust is a scale computed by TRUST IN COUNTRIES PARLIAMENT, TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES and TRUST IN 
POLITICIANS, and ranges from 0 – 30. N = 169 400 individuals in 25 countries.6 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the mean value of political trust combined for all the counties in the sample. 
The graph indicates that political trust is unchanged from 2004 to 2006, while it decreases from 
11.6 to 11.1 between 2006 and 2008, and from 11.1 to 10.3 between 2008 and 2010. The 
decrease from 2008 to 2010 is larger than the decrease from 2006 to 2008, but is still not severe 
enough to argue that the economic crisis is the only cause for the decline, or if it’s just a 
continuation of an earlier trend. The fact that political trust also declines between 2006 and 
2008, both time-points before the financial crisis,7 may indicate a negative trend, more than an 
effect of the financial crisis. From this figure where all countries are combined, there is no real 
indications that the crisis has affected levels of political trust. However, because the crisis have 
affected countries differently, it is necessary to study the change in trust when divided into 
subgroups. This is done in the figure beneath.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The countries included in the figure are Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Ukraine. 
7 As mentioned before, it takes time before the levels of trust are affected by the economic crisis, and therefore the 
2008 data are to close to the beginning of the crisis to be used as a ”during-crisis” measure point. 
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Figure 4: Trend in Political Trust – countries divided in subgroups  
  
Political trust is a scale computed by TRUST IN COUNTRIES PARLIAMENT, TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES and TRUST 
IN POLITICIANS, and ranges from 0 – 30. N = 169 400 individuals in 25 countries.8 
 
The figure above illustrates trends in mean political trust in the sample countries categorized in 
subgroups. The same questions and sample are used here, as in the previous graph. The 
countries are placed in five categories; Scandinavian, Mediterranean, East-European and 
continental countries, while UK and Ireland are placed in the final category. The Scandinavian 
countries show an increase in political trust from 2004 to 2008, and a small decline between 
2008 and 2010. The mean value decreases from 15.96 to 15.62 in this time period. It is not a 
severe decline, but the graph seemed to be increasing before the 2010 measure, which may 
indicate that something made the trust decline. It may also just be a fluctuation from the trend. 
The same trend can be seen in the continental countries as well. In UK and Ireland, the trust has 
been declining from 2004 to 2010.  
 In the Mediterranean countries however, trust levels increases between 2004 and 2006, 
decreases between 2006 and 2008, and falls severely between 2008 and 2010. This indicates 
that levels of trust has been falling from 2006, before the crisis, but the fall between 2008 and 
2010, is so significant that it is possible to state that this is an effect of the crisis. Between 2006 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  Scandinavian Countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweeden, and Finland. Continental Countries: Belgium, 
Switzerland, Germany, France, Netherlands. East-European countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Ukraine. Mediterranean countries: Greece, Spain, Portugal 
and Cyprus.  
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and 2008, level of trust fall from 11.15 to 10.28, while it between 2008 and 2010 fell down to 
only 7.48, which is a severe decrease. When comparing Mediterranean countries to the other 
subgroups, this is the category that has been affected by the crisis hardest. Greece, Spain, 
Cyprus and Portugal have all been feeling the effects of the financial crisis through, among 
other, very high unemployment and low economic growth. This supports the argument that 
economic performance, and the financial crisis, does affect levels of trust.  
 In the East-European countries the trust decreases from 2004 to 2008, and actually 
increases from 2008 to 2010. East-European countries are not as integrated in the world 
economy as the other European countries, and therefore not as affected by the crisis. This may 
explain the increase after the crisis occurred. However, there is a possibility that this is a “rally 
around the flag” effect, meaning a short-run increase in levels of support towards the leaders, or 
in this case, the political institutions in a country (Nannestad and Paldam 1994).  
2.4 Economic performance and political trust 
According to Bouckaert & Van de Walle (2001), a number of authors and politicians relate 
trust to good performance of government. The performance approach has two main parts, in 
which the first part deals with macro-performance, like unemployment, economic growth and 
inflation (Brown and Coulter 1983; Miller and Listhaug 1999; Anderson 1995; Kornberg and 
Clarke 1994; Zussman 1997), while the second part deals with micro-performance, that is, 
government service delivery (Norén 2000; Rose and Pettersen 2000). If there are variations in 
trust across countries, this may be due to variations in unemployment rates, the stability of 
governments etc. (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995). However, Blind (2006) argues that symptoms 
do not explain the causes of declining trust, and many different factors may be behind a 
decline. Public fear that governments have been incapable of dealing with previous current 
fiscal and financial challenges, in addition to periods of low economic growth, have been cited 
by several authors as possible factors (Blind 2006; Mansbridge 1997; Newton and Norris 
2000). This is important because this indicate that the it might not be for example 
unemployment directly that is the cause, but actually the way governments have handled the 
crisis.  
 To be able to answer the research question, the focus in this thesis will be on macro-
performance and its impact on political trust. However, I also need to be aware of Blind’s 
(2006) argument, that even if the results indicate that for example level of unemployment has 
an effect on political trust, it may be other factors than the actual increase that is behind the 
decline in trust. Also, as stated according to previous research, the key to investigate 
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satisfaction with performance, that in turn leads to trust, is the imbalance between expectations 
and performance, or the perception of it. Anderson (1973) describes different theories dealing 
with this imbalance. One of these theories indicates that any discrepancy between reality and 
expectations, even if small, will lead to a generalized negative state. Another theory claims that 
depending on the extent of the mismatch, it will either be enlarged or minimized (Anderson 
1973; Bouckaert and Van de Walle 2001). From this, it is indicated that economic performance, 
in this case how governments respond to an economic crisis, is important for the levels of trust. 
By applying the two theories presented above to the recent economic crisis, it is expected that if 
citizens are disappointed with the way the government handle the crisis, levels of trust will 
decrease.  
 Parts of the literature indicate that people have confidence in their leaders, either in 
form of people or institutions, when the government is working well. According to Uslaner 
(2002) people’s perceptions and opinions about government performance reflect their 
evaluations of specific personalities, institutions and policies. If the government does not 
manage to produce the outcomes expected by the people, trust is then assumed decreased. 
Several researchers (Easton 1965; McAllister 1999; Norris 1999) find that economic 
performance or political change may affect confidence in politicians and those in power, but 
not necessarily confidence in the political system as a whole. Kalenhalter et al. (2010) and 
Newton (2008: 243), find that reduced trust in institutions and governance system may damage 
the foundation of the system of government. Absence of political confidence could threaten 
government’s legitimacy, and the chance that citizens undermine the government’s authority 
increases. This is detrimental to democracy. Mistrust by the citizens is often expressed as an 
unwillingness to follow the political outcome, and this prevent progress from happening in the 
political process (Norris 1999).       
 What governments are able to accomplish is important for political trust, especially the 
economic performance, but also the expectations to this performance (Listhaug and Ringdal 
2008; Nannestad and Paldam 1994: 215).  People trust governments more if they have shown a 
capacity to generate economic growth, create jobs, provide access to social services and 
perform in a transparent manner (Fiorina 1978; Mackuen et al. 1992). When the government 
works well, citizens have confidence in those who govern, whether this is institutions, people, 
or political parties. In a recession however, the opposite will occur, and support for the 
government will be affected in a negative way (Listhaug and Ringdal 2008; Miller and 
Listhaug 1999; Nannestad and Paldam 1994: 215; Roth, Nowak-Lehman and Otter 2011; 
Uslaner 2002). According to Fiorina (1978), Mackuen et al. (1992), and Roth et al. (2011), 
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economic growth and access to work and social services makes citizens rely more on the 
government. If there is any doubt that the authorities are capable of managing the national 
economy, or respond to possible challenges in the event of an economic crisis, it may create 
mistrust. An argument against this is that, if trust has in fact declined, it has done so over a 
period of economic growth. However, political trust is influenced by many factors, and it may 
be the case that if growth has not increased, the levels of trust would have been even lower.  
Nye (1997) argues that citizens’ doubts regarding their national economy and governments’ 
ability to respond to these challenges could create even more distrust now, compared to earlier, 
because, as will be discussed later, the economy is more globalized today. According to 
Listhaug and Wiberg (1995) a lower gross national income will lower confidence in political 
institutions. From this, it is accurate to assume that both a positive growth rate and GDP will 
increase individual’s trust in political institutions, and we can deduct the following hypotheses 
about the levels of growth and GDP in relation to political trust:  
 
 H1: A high positive GDP growth rate is associated with high level of political trust. 
 H2:  A high level of GDP per capita leads to high levels of political trust. 
 Several researchers find that increased unemployment correlates with reduced political 
trust (e.g., Earle 2009; Midthjell 2010; Roth et al. 2011). Research on the effects of increased 
unemployment from earlier periods, also finds that in many countries, where unemployment 
levels have increased, this has contributed to reduced trust in politicians, political parties and 
political institutions (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995). Veiga and Veiga (2004) did a case study on 
Portugal, which indicates a strong effect of unemployment levels on a government’s popularity. 
Another case study, done by Sanders (2000) on the United Kingdom, finds that voters decide 
on the basis of government results regarding unemployment and inflation, and on the basis of 
expectations about the economic future. From this it is possible to assume that in countries 
where the unemployment rate is high, levels of political trust are low. This would reflect 
citizen’s dissatisfaction with government’s capability to manage the national economy, and 
respond for example an economic crisis. From this the hypothesis is as follows:  
  H3: A low level of unemployment is associated with high political trust. 
In a recent study on trust in political institutions by Roth et al. (2010), the relationship between 
debt and trust in political institutions was investigated. They looked at 27 European countries 
with data from both before and after the financial crisis, and concluded that an increase in GDP 
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debt reduces trust. Increased government debt often decreases spending, and when states 
tighten budgets and the banks become less willing to give out loans, the economic activity goes 
down. This happens in a situation where economic growth is already low and unemployment 
high (Regjeringen 2012). Therefore, it is reason to believe that for countries where the debt has 
increased, the citizen’s trust will be reduced. Hence, the following hypothesis appears: 
 H4: High GDP debt in percent of GDP in a country will lead to a lower level of 
 political trust. 
  In evaluating the influence of the economic conditions on political behavior, there is a 
crucial distinction between economic perception and economic reality. Considerable evidence 
suggests that voters believe that it is a central responsibility of the government to deliver high 
levels of economic performance. Since economic performance is judged by collective, rather 
than individual criteria, popular perceptions about the economy are shaped principally by the 
mass media and through an assessment of national economic conditions, and less by individual 
economic circumstances. Since these perceptions are mainly collective, they relate directly to 
governments and also, to some degree, to political institutions (McAllister 1999).  
 The relationship between real economic performance and levels of political support is a 
complex one. First, it is not the economy, itself that leads to a decline in political trust, but the 
citizens’ perceptions of economic performance. If citizens haven’t had information any 
information about the state of the economy, neither inflation nor unemployment would 
influence the levels of political support in any way (Huseby 1999). Hence, the perceptions of 
economic performance are essential in the relationship between real economic performance and 
political support. Both Dalton (2004) and Huseby (1999) find that individual’s perception of 
economic achievements can exert a direct impact on people's perception of the government, and 
may be more important than the economic numbers and the real economic situation. If the 
individual is negative towards the economic situation, or its own private economy, it can be 
reflected in the degree of political support. 
 
Another version of the economic performance thesis suggests that individual-
level perceptions of economic conditions may exert a more direct influence on 
citizen images of government than aggregate economic statistics. If citizens 
are pessimistic (or optimistic) about the economy and their personal economic 
situation, then these perceptions may be linked to feelings of political support. 
In other words, perceptions are realty when explaining individual citizen 
behavior (Dalton 2004: 4).  
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Literature on political knowledge (Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1991, 1993) implies 
that there is no reason to believe that all citizens, in all countries, at any time, will have full 
information about the state of the economy, or that they will perceive information about the 
economic performance in the same way. There are strong theoretical reasons to expect that 
government's achievements affect individuals' degree of political trust. I have conducted a table 
including a variable that measures individual’s satisfaction with the state of the economy. 
However, this measure is excluded in the main tables because it highly correlated with the 
dependent variable, see Appendix B, and also to some of the macroeconomic indicators. I will 
return to this discussion in section 4.3. 
 According to Nannestad and Paldam (1994), individuals hold the government 
responsible for economic development.9 The VP approach is often used when studying trust 
and support for governments. According to Nannestad and Paldam, the VP theory starts from 
the hypothesis that voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions. In their 
review, they conclude that nearly all studies have found highly significant VP functions, and 
that a clear pattern appears in the results. The most relevant findings from Nannestad and 
Paldam are that voters hold governments responsible for the development in the economy, and 
that a good economic development increases the popularity of the government, while a bad 
development decreases the popularity. The two most critical variables are unemployment and 
inflation (Nannestad and Paldam 1994: 216). 
 Roth (2009) finds that net trust in national government and parliament, increased in the 
direct aftermath of the financial crisis, which may indicate a so-called “rally around the flag” 
effect10 (Nannestad and Paldam 1994). His findings also suggest that the financial crisis is 
associated with a significant loss of citizens’ trust in the national parliament and government in 
the periphery countries Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. It is also evidence that an 
increased debt is associated with the loss of trust (Roth 2009; Roth et.al 2011). 
 From this section there are clear indications that economic performance has an impact 
on the levels of political trust. Much research has indicated macro-factors relevance as well. 
However, as illustrated above, there is also literature that focuses on individual’s perception of 
the economy, which cannot be ignored. Therefore, models including both types of measures 
have been conducted, meaning both individual perception on economic performance, as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 They have reviewed 25 years of research and literature on voters and popularity (VP) functions that explains, 
using economic and political variables, the support for government at elections and public opinion polls. 10	  As mentioned before is a short-run increase in support for the political institutions in a country (Nannestad and 
Paldam 1994).	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macroeconomic measures like unemployment, GDP, growth and debt. This will be discussed 
further in Chapter 4.  
2.5 The financial crisis  
Previous research suggests that there is a connection between low trust levels and economic 
downturns like the financial crisis (Roth 2009; Roth et.al 2011). Most researchers agree that 
early signs of the economic crisis could be seen already in 2007 (Roth 2009). According to 
Krugman (2009) the crisis is not like any earlier crisis, but rather like everything we’ve ever 
seen before, all at once: 
 
…a bursting real estate bubble comparable to what happened in Japan at the end of the 
1980s (albeit mainly involving the shadow banking system rather than conventional 
banks); a liquidity trap in the United States, again reminiscent of Japan; and, most 
recently, a disruption of international capital flows and a wave of currency crises all to 
reminiscent of what happened to Asia in the late 1990s (Krugman 1999: 165f). 
 
The U.S. housing boom began to deflate in the fall of 2005 – but it took a while for most people 
to notice. As prices rose to the point where purchasing a home became out of reach for many 
Americans,11 sales began to slacken off. Krugman writes that it was “a hissing sound as air 
began to leak out of the bubble” (Krugman 2009: 166f). By late spring of 2006, the weakness 
of the market started so sink in, and prices began dropping. By the second quarter of 2007, 
according to the widely used Chase-Shiller home price index, prices were only about three 
percent, but over the course of the next year, they fell more than 15 percent (IBID).  
 The housing bubble in the U.S. started because the banks lend money to loan takers that 
didn’t have security in another property, or enough income to service the interest rates when 
they began to climb. If the borrower was unable to service the loan, and housing prices 
continued increasing like they had been, the borrowers with problems could either refinance the 
loan or sell the property. When house prices started to fall, it was harder to sell, and default 
interests began to increase. The complexity of the financial structure that supported the sub-
prime lending dispersed ownership of mortgage loans out among many investors with different 
priorities on their claims, which created formidable legal obstacles against any form of debt 
relief. In the U.S., housing was probably overestimated by more than 50 percent in summer 
2006 (IBID). Because of increased financial globalization, with investors in each country 
holding large stakes in other countries, these cross-border investments acted as what 
economists call a “transmission mechanism,” allowing a crisis that started with the U.S. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  	  Even with no-down-payment, and teaser-rate loans (Krugman 2009).	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housing market to spread far beyond its borders. By fall 2008, the troubles of housing loans in 
places like Florida had destroyed the banking system in Iceland (IBID).  
 The problem for Europe was not so much these faulty loans,12 but the willingness of 
European banks to buy these mortgages in securitized forms, so the risk of default spread 
across the globe. When the banks failed, government’s bailed them out, and this has turned the 
financial crisis into a sovereign debt crisis (Krugman 2009, 2012). This is important, as 
politicians can be blamed, in form of diminishing confidence, for two things: 1) insufficient 
regulation of the banking sector, which led to the crisis; and 2) the bailing out of banks (which 
increased sovereign debt), rather than letting them go bankrupt.  It is hard to know which sort 
of blame is being allocated.  
 The bailout contributed to an increase of national debt. Falling housing prices have a 
direct negative effect on employment through the decline in construction, and they tend to lead 
to reduced consumer spending, because consumers feel poorer and lose access to home equity 
loans. These negative effects have a multiplier effect, as falling employment leads to further 
declines in spending (IBID).  The economy is stalling, despite repeated efforts by policymakers 
to get it going again, reminiscent of the crisis in the 1930s. We are now well into the realm of 
depression economics.13 Europe's situation has become worse, and is now in a recession 
(Krugman 2012). For most citizens, the slump is not as bad as The Great Depression, but for 
the Greeks, Irish and Spaniards, who have been hit hard, it is the same kind of situation that 
John Maynard Keynes described in the 1930s as: “a chronic condition of sub-normal activity 
for a considerable period without any marked tendency either towards recovery or towards 
complete collapse” (Keynes 1936). This reflects a lack of jobs, which inflicts enormous 
cumulative human danger (Krugman 2012). Compared to the U.S., Europe has suffered an 
employment slump that’s not quite as bad, but in terms of gross domestic product, countries in 
Europe have done worse. 
 The European experience is highly uneven across nations. Although Germany is 
relatively unscathed, the European periphery, according to Krugman (2012), is facing a much 
more severe situation. But because of the strong safety nets in European countries, the 
immediate consequences of unemployment are much less severe compared to the United States 
for example. Also, citizens of the European Union are free to travel across borders and find 
work, and many have chosen to do so. The international Monetary Found has studied the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 It was legislation in the U.S. in the 90s that forced banks to give loans to bad customers. 
13 Depression economics means that it is failures on the demand side of the economy. It is insufficient private 
spending to make use of the available productive capacity (Krugman 2009:182). 
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aftermath of past financial crises in a number of countries, and the findings are deeply 
disturbing. Not only do such crises inflict severe short-run damage, but they seem to take a 
huge long-term toll as well, with growth and employment shifted more or less permanently 
onto a lower track (Krugman 2012: 17).   
2.6 Economic indicators – evidence in numbers 
To be able to see if economic performance affects levels of trust, I need to control the actual 
economic situation by using macroeconomic indicators. I argue that by looking at the actual 
situation in the economy, and not only individual’s perceptions of the economic situation, I am 
able to get a bigger understanding of how economic performance influences political trust. In 
this section, the hypothesis regarding the financial crisis effect on actual economic situation is 
presented, as the previous hypotheses have focused on economic performance more in general.  
 Which economic variables should be included in the analyses to map a crisis effect on 
political trust?  Nannestad and Paldam (1994) find, as mentioned before, that unemployment is 
an important measure of the economic situation, but sometimes the real growth rate works 
better. Felix Roth (2011) uses the classical macroeconomic variables: inflation, unemployment, 
GDP growth and add GDP gross debt. Economic growth and unemployment have been used as 
economic indicators in previous literature on trust in government, which indicates their 
importance (Fiorina 1978; Mackuen et al. 1992; Roth et al. 2011). Roth et al. (2011) finds that 
a fast increase in debt, which happened when banks were bailed out, leads to a deterioration of 
citizens’ trust. One example of this is Ireland in 2010. GDP gross debt is included in the 
analysis to address the dramatic increases in debt in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
According to Roth et al. (2011) inflation is only affecting people’s trust when the economy runs 
smoothly. They argue that in times of crisis, citizens do not worry about inflation, but rather 
about jobs and the effects of a recession. Because of this, and because it is difficult to measure 
inflation in a satisfactory way,14 I have chosen to include measures on GDP growth, GDP per 
capita, GDP gross debt and unemployment, in the two main models. Inflation has been 
controlled for, but these models are added as sensitivity models in the Appendix. 
 GDP is an indicator for total value added in a country, and also gives an expression of 
gross income from domestic production activity (World Bank 2013c). GDP is one of the most 
frequently used indicators when measuring economic activity and production, and is therefore 
an important indicator to measure the effect of an economic crisis (Brandal 2012).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The problem with measuring inflation is that high levels as well as low levels are considered bad for the 
economy.  This will be discussed further later.  
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Table 2: GDP per capita (current US$) 
  2003 2005 2007 2009 
Belgium 30,039.09 36,011.47 43,255.40 43,848.00 
Bulgaria 2,641.79 3,733.26 5,498.04 6,403.15 
Croatia 7,689.96 10,090.37 13,376.01 13,461.40 
Cyprus 18,428.93 22,430.61 27,860.28 29,427.91 
Czech Republic 9,335.68 12,705.62 17,467.42 18,805.66 
Denmark 39,443.27 47,546.59 57,021.17 56,226.58 
Estonia 7,270.28 10,330.24 16,392.72 14,264.01 
Finland 31,508.88 37,318.80 46,538.17 44,837.71 
France 28,794.17 33,819.14 40,342.24 40,477.06 
United Kingdom 31,152.99 38,121.56 46,330.25 35,331.28 
Germany 29,367.41 33,542.78 40,402.99 40,275.25 
Greece 17,494.44 21,620.72 27,288.33 25,832.21 
Hungary 8,247.00 10,936.95 13,534.71 12,634.55 
Ireland 39,814.93 48,866.39 59,573.57 45,873.19 
Netherlands 33,177.36 39,122.29 47,770.80 48,173.91 
Norway 49,263.51 65,767.02 83,556.25 77,610.02 
Poland 5,674.74 7,963.02 11,157.27 11,293.85 
Portugal 15,509.13 18,185.62 21,845.24 22,015.92 
Russia 2,976.14 5,337.07 9,146.42 8,615.66 
Slovakia 8,520.59 11,384.53 15,583.40 16,100.08 
Slovenia 14,607.20 17,854.64 23,441.00 24,051.04 
Spain 21,041.54 26,056.39 32,118.10 31,714.24 
Sweden 35,131.21 41,040.67 50,558.40 43,639.55 
Switzerland 45,588.62 51,734.30 59,663.77 65,790.07 
Ukraine 1,048.52 1,828.72 3,068.61 2,973.98 
For Croatia, Greece, Ireland and Ukraine, 2010 levels of GDP are used instead of 
2009, and for Ireland in 2007 it is used 2008 levels. This is because of the ESS 
collection periods. Data are in constant U.S. dollars. Numbers marked in red 
indicates a reduced GDP from 2007 to 2009. 
 
  
 In this sample, GDP per capita is lower in 13 out of 25 countries in 2009 compared to 
2007. Gross domestic product, which normally grows a couple percent a year, is barely above 
its pre-crisis peak even in countries that have seen a relatively strong recovery, and it is down 
by double digits in several European states (Krugman 2012). When GDP is high, the economic 
activity is high as well. Since it is expected that high levels of GDP correlate with high levels 
of trust, it is assumed that in countries where GDP is reduced as a consequence of the crisis, the 
trust has been reduced as well.  From this, the fifth hypothesis arises:  
 
 H5: A decrease in GDP per capita will result in reduced political trust. 
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GDP growth is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local 
currency (World Bank 2013a). A decline in GDP growth is negative for countries economies, 
and a negative growth is regarded as very serious. 
 Table 3 illustrates that all the countries had a lower growth in GDP in 2009 compared to 
in 2007, and out of the 25 countries, 22 of them have gone from having a positive, to a negative 
growth rate. Some of the countries experienced a more severe decrease than others, but the 
overall trend is alarming. It is only two of the countries, Ukraine and Poland, that had a positive 
rate, but the growth has also decreased much in these countries. A possible reason for Ukraine 
and Poland’s positive growth can be that they are not as integrated in the Western economy, as 
the other countries are. From this table, the implication of the crisis indicates that the countries 
economies have regressed many years before the crisis appeared. From this reasoning, the 
following hypothesis can be deducted: 
 
Table 3: GDP growth (in percent of GDP) 
    2003 2005 2007 2009 
Belgium 0.81 1.75 2.88 -2.78 
Bulgaria 5.50 6.40 6.40 -5.50 
Switzerland 0.02 2.69 3.85 -1.94 
Cyprus 1.93 3.91 5.13 -1.67 
Czech Republic 3.77 6.75 5.73 -4.51 
Germany -0.38 0.68 3.27 -5.13 
Denmark 0.38 2.45 1.58 -5.67 
Estonia 7.77 8.85 7.49 -14.07 
Spain 3.09 3.58 3.48 -3.74 
Finland 2.01 2.92 5.34 -8.54 
France 0.90 1.83 2.29 -3.15 
United Kingdom 3.81 2.77 3.63 -3.97 
Greece 5.94 2.28 3.54 -4.94 
Croatia 5.37 4.28 5.06 -1.41 
Hungary 3.85 3.96 0.11 -6.80 
Ireland 4.16 5.34 -2.97 -0.43 
Netherlands 0.34 2.05 3.92 -3.67 
Norway 0.98 2.59 2.65 -1.67 
Poland 3.87 3.62 6.79 1.63 
Portugal -0.91 0.78 2.37 -2.91 
Russia 7.30 6.38 8.54 -7.82 
Sweden 2.34 3.16 3.31 -5.03 
Slovenia 2.93 4.01 6.87 -8.01 
Slovakia 4.78 6.66 10.49 -4.93 
Ukraine 9.40 2.70 7.90 4.20 
For Croatia, Greece, Ireland and Ukraine, 2010 levels of growth are 
used instead of 2009, and for Ireland in 2007 it is used 2008 levels. 
This is because of the ESS collection periods. Numbers marked in red 
illustrates a decreased growth rate. 
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 H6: A decreased GDP growth rate, as a consequence of the financial crisis, will reduce 
citizens’ political trust. 
 
Table 4: Unemployment (yearly in percent)  
  2003 2005 2007 2009 
Belgium 8.20 8.40 7.50 7.90 
Bulgaria 13.70 10.10 6.90 6.80 
Switzerland 4.10 4.40 3.60 4.10 
Cyprus 4.10 5.30 3.90 5.30 
Czech Republic 7.80 7.90 5.30 6.70 
Germany 9.30 11.10 8.60 7.70 
Denmark 5.40 4.80 3.80 6.00 
Estonia 10.70 7.90 4.70 13.80 
Spain 11.30 9.20 8.30 18.00 
Finland 9.00 8.40 6.80 8.20 
France 8.60 8.90 8.00 9.10 
United Kingdom 4.80 4.60 5.20 7.70 
Greece 9.70 9.90 8.30 12.5 
Croatia -  - 9.60 11.8 
Hungary 5.90 7.20 7.40 10.00 
Ireland 4.50 4.30  6.00  13.5 
Netherlands 3.60 4.70 3.20 3.40 
Norway 4.40 4.60 2.50 3.20 
Poland 19.60 17.70 9.60 8.20 
Portugal 6.30 7.60 8.00 9.50 
Russia 8.20 7.20 6.10 8.40 
Sweden 5.80 7.70 6.10 8.30 
Slovenia 6.70 6.50 4.80 5.90 
Slovakia 17.50 16.20 11.00 12.10 
Ukraine 9.10 7.20 6.40 8.70 
For Croatia, Greece, Ireland and Ukraine, 2010 levels of 
unemployment are used instead of 2009, and for Ireland in 2007, 
2008 levels are used. This is because of the ESS collection 
periods. Numbers marked in red illustrates increased 
unemployment rate between 2007 and 2009.  
 
 According to Krugman (2012), current unemployment has reached levels that would 
have seemed inconceivable before the crisis. Youth unemployment in Italy and Ireland is 
approaching 30 percent, while in Spain it is reaching 43 percent (Krugman 2012). Low 
unemployment indicates that there is pressure in the labor market. Wages increase, which may 
lead to price pressure, high production and generally good times. High unemployment indicates 
the opposite. Trends in the unemployment rate reflect the state of the economy, but the effect 
does not show immediately. As the figures for GDP often are revised afterwards, the 
development in unemployment provides a picture of how the state of the economy has been 
(Brandal 2012). Therefore, it may be a possibility that not enough time has past after the crisis, 
and that it is too early to see an effect on unemployment. Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) and 
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Roth et al. (2011) see unemployment as a key determinant of trust, and that it has a strong and 
negative effect on trust in public institutions. 
 Table 4 illustrates that out of the 25 countries in the sample, 21 of them have 
experienced increased unemployment. In other countries, such as Belgium, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, Finland and France, the increase may not be severe enough to influence trust. In 
Estonia, Spain, and Greece on the other hand, the unemployment level has increased so 
significantly that it should affect levels of trust. It is expected that an increase in unemployment 
will reduce political trust. Also, in countries where the financial crisis has caused a significant 
increase in unemployment, it is expected that this has affected trust in a negative way. Hence 
the following hypothesis appear: 
 H8: Increase in unemployment reduces citizen’s political trust.  
Table 5: General government gross debt  (percent of GDP) 
  2003 2005 2007 2009 
Belgium 98.40 92.00 84.00 95.70 
Bulgaria 46.50 29.40 18.60 15.60 
Switzerland 65.80 70.10 55.60 51.80 
Cyprus 69.70 69.40 58.80 58.50 
Czech Republic 28.60 28.40 28.00 34.30 
Germany 64.40 68.50 65.40 74.70 
Denmark 56.60 45.40 34.10 40.60 
Estonia 5.60 4.60 3.70 7.20 
Spain 48.80 43.20 36.30 53.90 
Finland 44.50 41.70 35.20 43.50 
France 63.20 66.70 64.20 79.20 
United Kingdom 38.70 41.80 43.70 68.00 
Greece 101.70 98.60 106.10 129.70 
Croatia 35.40 38.20 32.90 42.20 
Hungary 58.50 61.70 67.00 79.70 
Ireland 30.80 27.10 44.50 92.20 
Netherlands 52.00 51.80 45.30 60.80 
Norway 48.40 47.80 56.80 48.90 
Poland 47.10 47.10 45.00 50.90 
Portugal 55.70 62.50 68.30 83.10 
Russia 30.40 14.20 8.50 11.30 
Sweden 51.00 50.00 39.70 42.00 
Slovenia 27.60 26.80 23.10 35.00 
Slovak Republic 43.40 41.50 30.50 27.90 
Ukraine 29.40 17.70 12.30 40.50 
For Croatia, Greece, Ireland and Ukraine, 2010 levels of debt are used 
instead of 2009, and for Ireland in 2007, 2008 levels are used. This is 
because of the ESS collection periods. Numbers marked in red 
illustrates increased debt in percent of GDP between 2007 and 2009.  
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 Because the financial crisis has culminated into a sovereign debt crisis from 2010 and 
onwards in Europe, it is important to control for the effect of this as well (Roth et.al. 2011). I 
have therefore, chosen to include gross debt in percent of GDP in the analysis. In this sample, 
20 out of the 25 countries have experienced an increase in general government gross debt. For 
most of the countries, the debt is a much larger percent of GDP in 2009 compared to 2007. 
During the financial crisis, many countries have responded to the crisis by implementing 
austerity measures. The austerity measures have led to a further deterioration of economic 
performance, which has lead to a rapid increase of unemployment levels in Europe’s periphery 
(Roth et al. 2012). Measures like this are seldom popular among the citizens, and as a 
consequence high government debt is regarded as negative for a country’s economy. Increased 
government debt is often linked with public policy, and for many countries increasing debt 
level, have been the only option to for example reduce the unemployment. One possibility is 
that voter confidence would be affected by the state’s inability to limit spending, which would 
be reflected by a higher debt level.  
 A possible problem is that increasing the debt level is the only real alternative for 
countries to get out of the current crisis, and therefore, some voters might show increased levels 
of confidence with higher levels of debt. This challenge is controlled for by, measuring average 
levels of debt before the crisis, and comparing them to the effect of debt levels during the crisis. 
If some voters would think like mentioned above, levels of trust would be higher during the 
crisis with the same debt level as before the crisis (before the crisis high debt levels, less 
confidence, and during the crisis high debt levels, more confidence). From Figure A6 and A7, it 
is no indications that voters have higher trust with the same debt level before, and during the 
crisis. However, the tables indicate that increased debt increases levels of trust.15 This might be 
because when even if government is running a budged deficit, spending continues like normal, 
and level of debt does not directly affect citizens in the short run.  However, if government debt 
is ignored, it has the potential to affect citizen’s daily lives by the need to reduce taxes in the 
future, in addition to a slower growing economy (Blanchard 2006). Previous research find that 
falling levels of trust in national governmental institutions during times of crises seem to be 
primarily related to an increase in government debt (Roth et al. 2011). From this the following 
hypothesis arises:  
 
 H7: An increase in GDP gross debt leads to reduced political trust. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Table A8 illustrates the correlation between debt and political trust for all countries combined as well, this 
illustrates the same positive correlation.   
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 When using a sample of 25 countries, it is natural that there are differences among 
them, and how their economies react to an economic crisis. The Norwegian economy has for 
example reacted differently compared to Spain’s economy. As a result, the level of political 
trust may also be affected different across countries. The economic measures are intended to 
capture the variation between countries. 
2.7 Other included measures 
The causal relationship between dependent and independent variables is not explained by a 
regression analysis. A regression analysis only illustrates if there is a correlation between X and 
Y, and not which of the ones leads to a change in the other. Therefore it is important to explain 
the relationship using causal theory. I have included three variables in addition to demographic 
variables at the individual level. These are political interest, political participation and 
employment status. 
 Cattenberg and Moreno (2005) argue that those who express interest in politics tend to 
be those who actually like politics, and also those who are more politically engaged. Because 
the citizens are more engaged and have higher interest for politics, they will, have higher levels 
of trust. I therefore find it necessary to include a measure on political interest and also a 
measure on political participation. By controlling for this, I will separate between politically 
engaged and unengaged citizens. Previous research (Aardal 2003; Diven and Constantelos 
2011) finds evidence that political participation and interest generates higher levels of political 
trust.  
 I have also chosen to include a measure on employment situation. The measure, which 
measures citizens who are unemployed and looking for a job is included, because as mentioned 
before, access to work and social services makes citizens rely more on the government. Being 
unemployed affects these citizens directly, and according to Fiorina (1978), Mackuen et al. 
(1992) and Roth et al. (2011), as a consequence of this, they will have lower levels of trust. 
Also mentioned before, many countries, for example Spain, have a very high unemployment 
rate among the young, and because of this it is tested for age squared as well. 
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3. Data and Method 	  
To measure the effect of an economic crisis on political trust, I have chosen to do so in several 
steps. In the first table, I test how the macroeconomic variables impacts levels of political trust. 
This give answer to how economic performance affects political trust on a general basis, but 
also indications on how the financial crisis has affected political trust. If for example, an 
increase in unemployment correlates with reduced political trust,16 this indicates that a country 
that has experienced increased unemployment, as a consequence of the economic crisis, would 
have citizens with reduced political trust. The second table employs the same macroeconomic 
measures, but in this table the effects of the changes in the variables are measured. In this way, 
it is possible to measure the direct effect of the economic crisis. The two tables combined will 
give answer to 1) if macroeconomic measures have an impact on political trust; and 2) if a 
change in the economic indicators, as a consequence of the crisis, has an effect on political 
trust. After conducting these tables I include an individual-level measure that reflect individual 
perception of the economic situation. The reason why I build the analysis this way, is that I am 
able to see how macroeconomic performance influence political trust, and, if the effect of 
macroeconomic performance related to the crisis reduces confidence, before I test how 
individual perception fits into this. The sample I have chosen to answer if economic 
performance has an effect on levels of trust includes data from three ESS rounds before the 
crisis and one after the crisis.17 It is important to include as many rounds as possible, because 
this will catch a possible downwards spiral in political trust,18 as mentioned in the introduction. 
ESS round 5, collected during the crisis, is necessary to control for the effect of the crisis.  
 In order to answer the research question, I employ a multilevel analysis of pooled data 
from the European Social Survey (ESS) covering 25 countries. I use data from four waves. See 
Table A1 in Appendix for country and country-years included. For each country, the ESS 
provides information on individual’s social values, cultural norms and behavior patterns. 
Within each country, a representative sample of approximately 2,000 individuals is surveyed. 
The four surveys use the same questionnaire and methodology. European Social Survey uses 
professional interviewers and random sampling of data. Also, because it is used the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 When controlled for other variables. 
17 ESS Round 5: European Social Survey Round 5 Data 2010; ESS Round 4: European Social Survey Round 4 
Data 2008; ESS Round 3: European Social Survey Round 3 Data 2006; ESS Round 2: European Social Survey 
Round 2 Data 2004; ESS Round 1: European Social Survey Round 1 Data 2002. 
18 The first round of European Social Survey is not possible to use because TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES, one of the 
components in the dependent variable, is not surveyed. 
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questionnaire and methodology across rounds, questions that have been problematic has been 
adjusted or removed. This constitutes to strengthening the reliability of the models.  
 The individual data are made available in an anonymous form by NSD,19 and the data 
for the economic indicators are gathered from World Bank - World Development Indicators 
and IMF. Both World Bank and IMF are considered reliable sources, and I assume that the 
measures created with this data are of good quality, and therefore can be generalized across 
countries. Neither NSD, nor the World Bank, and IMF are responsible for the analysis or 
interpretations made in this thesis.  
3.1 Model specifications 
To study the financial crisis’ effect on political trust, I will employ a multilevel modeling. This 
approach is advantageous since the data is of hierarchical structure, which means that some 
units of analysis are considered a subset of other units. In this case, individual respondents are 
considered a subset of countries. There are statistical reasons for using this approach. Because 
of shared history, experiences, environment etc., respondents from the same country are more 
similar than respondents from different countries. This shared context is a cause of dependency 
among observations (Ringdal no date; Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 220).  By using OLS-
regression to analyze this kind of data, one would violate the assumption of statistical 
independency, and this would lead to an inaccurate estimation of the standard errors. This 
would increase the chance to discard H0, even if it is correct (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 
220). When using multilevel analysis we are able to account for variance in a dependent 
variable measured at the lowest level, by taking the higher levels into consideration (Ringdal no 
date; Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219). In the multilevel analysis the respondents constitute 
level 1, the country-years level 2, and countries level 3, where the individuals become 
subgroups of the country-years, which are subgroups of the countries. A substantial reason for 
using multilevel analysis is that I am mainly interested in the effects of variables at the second 
level.  By using another method I would not be able to measure these effects in a satisfactory 
way, since such variables cannot be assigned the individual level (IBID). By using a “Random 
intercept”-model, one can expect that the effect of the explanatory variables is the same in 
every sample, but that the intercept varies across the level-2 and level-3 units (IBID). 
According to Hox (2010: 233f) it is possible to use multilevel modeling as long as there are 
more than 30 groups on level-2. This analysis includes 93 country-years, and 25 countries. 
Level-2, the level where the economic measures are included, is of sufficient size.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Norwegian Social Science Data Services, http://www.nsd.uib.no/ 
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 I make a distinction between micro and macro explanatory variables. Several scholars 
(Lockerbie 1993; Weatherford 1987; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Taylor 1997; Miller and 
Listhaug 1999) have demonstrated the individual-level relationship between perceptions of 
government economic performance and levels of political support. According to Huseby (1999) 
it has been harder to demonstrate a direct relationship between indicators of real economy like 
unemployment and inflation, and perceptions of economic performance and political trust on an 
aggregated level. However, to measure the financial crisis effect on political trust, I see it 
necessary to focus mainly on real economic performance using unemployment, GDP per capita, 
GDP debt and GDP growth. To avoid Hauser’s contextual fallacy,20 it is also controlled for 
individual-level indicators.   
3.2 The issue of causality 
According to Ruscio (1996), one should always clearly state whether trust is dealt with as a 
dependent or independent variable, as “trust is a difficult issue because it is both cause and 
effect” (Ruscio 1996: 473). When running regressions, it is important to be aware of the fact 
that there is always a possibility that the left-hand side variable and the right-hand side 
variables influence each other. In this case, also that macroeconomic measures: GDP, growth, 
unemployment and debt are affected by a common event. There is also a possibility that these 
variables stand in a bidirectional relationship with political trust (Roth et al. 2011), for 
example, that decreased levels of political trust may exacerbate an already existing economic 
downturn. By lagging21 all macro-economic measures one year for time-dependence,22 I reduce 
the possibility for reverse causality. Also, another reason for lagging the variables is that 
individuals’ attitudes do not change immediately after an increase or decrease happens, it takes 
time, and to be able to see an effect of the change in these macro-variables a one-year lag is 
necessary.  
 Bouckaert and Van de Walle (2001) claim that when doing research on trust, there are 
often theoretical reasons for both directions of influence, for example if satisfaction leads to 
trust, or if trust leads to satisfaction. Also, Huseby (2000) states that survey data on the 
relationship between evaluations of government performance and political support is incapable 
of establishing the direction of causality. It is uncertain whether citizens give negative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Hauser (1970) criticized the contextual analysis because he maintained that most alleged contextual effects 
lacked substance and were artifacts of inadequately specified individual-level models. The term contextual fallacy 
is used to describe this phenomenon (Ringdal no date)  
21 The exceptions are Croatia, Greece, Ireland and Ukraine where it is used 2010 levels instead of 2009, and for 
Ireland in 2007 it is used 2008 levels. This is due to data limitations. 
22 Meaning that previous years level on the economic indicators predicts the current value of political trust.  
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responses to questions on government performance because they do not trust government, or if 
they loose faith in government because they evaluate the economic performance as poor 
(Huseby 2000). For this reason, one ought to be careful using attitude variables as control 
variables, when an attitude measure is also used as the dependent variable. For this reason I am 
careful about generalizing findings from the models using the individual variable measuring 
individual’s perception of the economic situation. In addition to this measure, I have two 
attitude measures on the individual level, political interest and a measure on political 
participation, which may be problematic. However, I rely on previous research from Cattenberg 
and Moreno (2005), Diven and Constantelos (2011) and Aardal (2003), who find that citizens 
that are engaged, and have high interest for politics, have higher levels of trust, and assume that 
the causal relationship used is correct. 
 3.3 Operationalization of Political Trust 
The dependent variable POLITICAL TRUST is a scale computed from three variables in the 
European Social Survey, in which I assume measures this phenomenon. The original variables 
are TRUST IN COUNTRY’S PARLIAMENT, TRUST IN POLITICIANS and TRUST IN POLITICAL 
PARTIES. The respondents were asked the following question: 
  
Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the 
institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have 
complete trust. [Country]’s parliament? 
The same question was used to ask the respondents about trust in politicians and trust in 
political parties. A factor analysis is done to understand the structure and correlation between a 
given set of variables. The two main types are exploratory and confirmatory. In this thesis, I 
use exploratory factor analysis, as I have no a priori assumptions on the number of factors 
present in my set of variables (Ulleberg and Nordvik 2003). By applying this approach, one 
assumes that the observed variables are linear combinations of underlying factors, which best 
describe observed covariance between variables. The method of extraction of factors used is a 
principal component analysis.23 The principal component analysis, see Appendix B, illustrates 
that there are four components drawn from the included variables. The three measures TRUST 
IN POLITICAL PARTIES, TRUST IN POLITICIANS and TRUST IN COUNTRY’S PARLIAMENT have a 
single underlying construct or factor. There are several other measures that score high on this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 It differs from factor analysis in that it seeks to explain all of the variance in each variable, instead of just the 
common factor if the N is large. The difference between these two methods is small, and the name factor analysis 
is also used with regards to principal component analysis (Ulleberg and Nordvik 2001).  
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factor, but because I use Norris’ (1999) conceptualization of trust, I include only these three 
variables as they measure trust in political institutions. By including TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM 
and TRUST IN THE POLICE, the scale would measure institutional trust instead of political trust. 
SATISFIED WITH NATIONAL GOVERNMENT is excluded because it measures satisfaction with 
parties or party coalitions, which is not a political institution. Also HOW SATISFIED WITH THE 
WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS IN COUNTRY and HOW SATISFIED WITH PRESENT STATE OF 
ECONOMY have high scores on this component, but they do not capture trust in political 
institutions, so they are not included in the scale.  
 A Chronbach’s alpha test on the three variables has also been conducted. Chronbach’s 
alpha is a measure on reliability, and a function of the correlation between the variables tested 
for. A merged measure has a satisfactory reliability if Chronbach’s Alpha is greater than 0.7 
(Ringdal 2013: 358). In this case Chronbach’s alpha is 0.911, see Table B3. One may discuss if 
this is too high, when reliability higher than 0.8, often is considered to be too high (Nunnally 
1978: 245). The high correlation may be caused by the fact that the questions asked to the 
respondents, are almost identical and asked coherent. This can make the questions hard to 
distinguish. The measure would have been more reliable if each measure included several 
questions on each subject, like for example three to five sub-questions. The high value indicates 
that the variables measure the same phenomenon. Still, it is a possibility that some respondents 
have been able to distinguish between the questions, and therefore the scale is considered more 
valid than the one of the three variables by them selves24. The variable is scaled from 0 to 30, 
where 0 means no trust at all, and 30 means complete trust. Political trust is a normally 
distributed variable. It’s necessary that the dependent variable is as normally distributed as 
possible, if not, it could create imprecise standard errors, and one would have to consider using 
robust standard errors.  
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics: POLITICAL TRUST 
  N Min. Max. Mean Std. deviation 
Political trust 149,640 0 30 10.100 6.708 
 	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  Since there are no other measures on political trust in the dataset, the created scale is used despite this possible 
problem. 
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3.4 Included macroeconomic measures 
At the country-year level I have included four variables, all of which are economic indicators 
on the state of economy in a country. The data for these measures are gathered from World 
Bank and IMF. Included in the sample are many different economies, which can be affected by 
the crisis in different ways. Therefore by including four different economic indicators, I am 
able to capture as many aspects of the crisis as possible.    
 The four indicators, which are lagged one-year, are GDP PER CAPITA, GDP GROWTH, GDP 
GROSS DEBT and UNEMPLOYMENT. GDP PER CAPITA is gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes, and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars25 (World 
Bank 2013c), and divided on 1000. It is however possible to log transform it, but the 
distribution, is better if it is divided on 100026. A possible reason for this is that the countries in 
Europe are more alike, compared to when sampling for example the whole world. GDP 
GROWTH is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local 
currency (World Bank 2013a). GDP GROSS DEBT consists of all liabilities that require payment 
or payments of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the 
future. This includes debt liabilities in the form of Special Drawing Rights’ (SDR),27 currency 
and deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes, 
and other accounts payable (IMF 2013). UNEMPLOYMENT is measured in percent of total labor 
force, and refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and 
seeking employment28 (World Bank 2013b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2000 official exchange rates. For a few 
countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange 
transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used. 
26  If dividing the measure on 1000, skewness is .467 and kurtosis is 2.763. If log transforming it, skewness is  
– 1.121 and kurtosis is 4.113. 	  
27 For more information on SDR see http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm 
28 Definitions of labor force and unemployment differ by country. 
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Figure 5: Expected effect of the financial crisis on political trust 
  
 For these indicators two versions are created. In the first model where I use GDP PER 
CAPITA LEVEL, GDP GROWTH LEVEL, GDP GROSS DEBT LEVEL and UNEMPLOYMENT LEVEL I 
measure the level of the economic measures and its correlation with POLITICAL TRUST.  For the 
second model where I examine the change, the economic indicators measure the change in 
these indicators from a given survey-year to the next. The value for a given survey-year is 
created by taking the value for current survey-year subtracted by the value for previous survey 
year. A significant effect of these measures will indicate that the financial crisis has in fact 
reduced people’s trust in political institutions.   
  The variables ESS2, ESS3 and ESS4 are dummy variables that compare trust-levels in 
2004, 2006 and 2008 to ESS5 - 2010. Round 4, that is conducted before the end of 2008 is 
considered a measure before the crisis because of the lagging-effect mentioned above. This 
justifies the use of the ESS4 (2008) data as a before-crisis measure. ESS5 (2010) is collected 
during the year of 2010, and are therefore used to measure the effect during a crisis.  
 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics: independent variables at the country-year level 
  N Min. Max. Mean Mean (%) Std. dev 
2004 147,256 0 1 
 
22.00 .41 
2006 147,256 0 1 
 
22.90 .42 
2008 147,256 0 1 
 
27.30 .45 
2010 147,256 0 1 
 
27.90 .45 
GDP per capita level b 147,256 1.05 83.56 28.94
 
17.78 
Unemployment levela 147,256 2.50 19.60 7.89 3.29 
GDP gross debt level 147,256 3.70 129.70 50.18 
 
25.10 
GDP growth changea 147,256 -21.56 5.20 -1.86 
 
5.05 
GDP per capita changeb 147,256 -13.70 17.80 3.70 
 
4.89 
Unemployment changea 147,256 -8.10 9.7 .20 2.39 
GDP gross debt change 147,256 -17.00 47.7 1.57 
 
10.02 
a measure is presented in yearly numbers in percentages b the measure is presented in constant 2000 US$ and 
divided by 1000. 
The  Financial 
Crisis 
Increased 
Debt 
Increased 
Unemployment 
Reduced  
Growth 
Reduced  
GDP  
Reduced  
Political Trust  
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3.5 Included variables at the individual level 
At the individual level I have included measures on political interest, political participation - if 
the respondent voted last national election, personal employment situation, and the following 
demographic variables; FEELING ABOUT HOUSEHOLD’S INCOME, EDUCATION, WOMAN, AGE 
and AGE SQUARED. Also, as much previous research has indicated the importance of individual 
perception of economic situation, I have included a measure for this as well. HOW SATISFIED 
WITH PRESENT STATE OF ECONOMY IN COUNTRY, is scaled from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied. 
 POLITICAL INTEREST is measured by the question “how interested would you say you 
are in politics” and the answer categories have been recoded to 1, “not at all interested”; 2,  
“hardly interested”; 3, “quite interested” and 4, “very interested”. It is expected that high 
interest in politics generate higher trust levels. Political activity is included by a dummy 
variable, VOTED LAST NATIONAL ELECTION, which indicates whether the responded voted (1) 
or not (0). The variable measures electoral participation, and does not capture all forms of 
political participation, but it is assumed to be good enough as a control variable. The variable 
UNEMPLOYED measure employment situation. It is a dummy variable comparing those that are 
unemployed and looking for a job with those that are either employed, unemployed not looking 
for a job, those that are under education or community or military service, or permanently sick 
or disabled, retired, homemakers and others. The measure has a total of 5922 unemployed 
respondents or about 3.96 percent, and 143,718 (96,04 percent) in the reference category. It is 
expected that those who are unemployed and looking for a job have less trust compared to the 
reference category.  
 FEELING ABOUT HOUSEHOLD INCOME 29  is a subjective measure, controlling for 
individual’s perception of the households economic situation. For this purpose, the individual’s 
perceptions may be just as good as the actual economic situation. The variable have four 
categories where 1, “Very difficult on present income”; 2, “Difficult on present income”; 3, 
“Coping on present income” and 4, “Living comfortably on present income”. EDUCATION 
measures years of full-time education completed. The scale has a range from 0 to 56.  EDUYRS 
is not the best indicator of educational attainment in the ESS. One of the reasons for this is that 
it may have problematic high values. In this case, number of respondents is regarded to be high 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Originally I wanted to include a measure on the individual’s income, but there is no such measure in the dataset. 
An alternative would have been a measure for household total net income, but because ESS has for rounds 2 and 3, 
deployed standard categories, an approach they departed in round 4 and 5 because a standard income variable for 
all countries was insufficient in dealing with diverse national income distribution. This makes it difficult to 
harmonize the two measures on household income without a great amount of recoding’s. 
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enough, and therefore it is not likely that respondents with problematic high values will 
influence the results.30 Gender is a dummy variable named WOMAN, where value 1 is for 
women and 0 is for men. Age is measured in years, and in order to capture the high 
unemployment among young people, I have also included a squared age variable.31 It is 
possible to use a centered version of age (Hox 2010: 68f), but this is not done in this analysis. 
 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics: independent variables at the individual-level 
  N Min. Max. Mean Mean (%) Std. dev 
How satisfied with present state 
of economy in country  149,640   0 10 4.23  2.52 
Political interest 149,640 0 3 1.41 
 
.89 
Voted last national electiona  149,640 0 1 
 
78.30 .41 
Unemployedb  149,640 0 1 
 
3.97 .20 
Feeling about household income  149,640 0 3 1.88
 
.90 
Educationc  149,640 0 56 12.24 
 
4.09 
Womand 149,640 0 1 
 
53.78 .50 
Age 149,640 14 123 49.47
 
17.49 
Age squared 149,640 196 15,129 2,750.907 
 
1,801.00 
a reference category did not vote last national election, b reference category employed, unemployed not looking 
for a job, permanently sick or disabled, retired, homemakers under education, community or military service 
and others, c reference category men, d reference category 2010. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 An alternative variable is EISCED, a measure that categorizes education levels, but because this variable results in 
367 missing and 44,742 respondents not possible to harmonize into the variable, I have chosen to use EDUYRS. 
31 Another possibility would have been to test for this using cohorts, but because this uses many d.f. I choose to 
use a squared version of age.	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4. Results  
 
In this chapter I present the results. The first section, section 4.1, analyses the correlation 
between level or degree of growth, GDP, unemployment, debt and political trust. This model 
gives an answer to how the correlation between economic performance and political trust is. In 
the second section, I control for the effect of a change in these indicators and its effect on trust. 
This section investigates how the financial crisis has affected citizen’s trust. Also, because it is 
reason to believe that perception of economic performance is as important as economic 
performance itself, it is included a section studying the relationship between perceptions of 
economic performance and the actual economic performance. As will be discussed, there are 
some problems with including the measure HOW SATISFIED WITH PRESENT STATE OF 
ECONOMY IN COUNTRY. To begin, the individual-level variable scores high on the same 
component as political trust, and second, the measure also correlates to some degree with the 
macroeconomic measures. Because of this I am cautious when generalizing the findings from 
this section.  
 In the analysis I have 149,640 individuals, 93 country-years, and 25 countries in both 
Table 9 and 10. For the tables in section 4.3 I have 147,256 individuals from 25 countries for 
four years. A large sample like this makes me able to include several variables at level-2 
without having to worry about biased results (Hox 2010: 233f). I use a random intercept 
version of multilevel analysis. When using a random intercept model one assume that the 
effects of the variables are the same, meaning that the regression lines have the same slope, but 
that the intercept varies between the level-2 and, in this case, level-3 units (Hox 2010; Strabac 
2007: 184).  
 The analysis follows a bottom-up structure, starting with a simple model, and then 
adding complexities. According to Hox (2010: 55f) this is a more useful method compared to a 
top-down approach, which may lead to convergence problems due to starting with a large, 
complicated model. I start by estimating an empty model32, which is a model with no 
regressors. The empty model can be formally defined as: 
 𝛾ijk= β0 + eijk + u0jk + v0k 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This is not included in the table. 
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Where β0 is the constant, e represents the level-1 residual, u and v represents the level-2 and 
level-3 residuals. The subscript i vary across level-1 units (individuals), while j varies across 
the level-2 units (country-year), and k varies across level-3 units (country). This model is useful 
to determine the proportion of POLITICAL TRUST on the various levels of analysis. The Variance 
Partition Coefficient (VPC) illustrates how the variance in POLITICAL TRUST is divided 
between each level in the analysis (Ringdal no date). For Table 9 and 10, 20.2 percent of the 
variance in political trust exists between countries, while 3.9 percent exists between country-
years. This indicates that most of the variance in political trust exists between individuals. The 
variation between country-years is not that high, but the level is still regarded as necessary, 
because of the structure of the dataset.    
4.1 How does macroeconomic indicators affect political trust? 
Model 1 in Table 9, includes all the individual-level variables. This is done to avoid Hauser’s 
contextual fallacy and to find out how much of the variance between country-years that is 
explained by compositional effects. In Model 2, I have added the time-control variables, and in 
Model 3 through 6 I have added the macro-level variables one by one. This is regarded as 
necessary because the macro-variables may affect one another as well as the dependent 
variable, in addition to the fact that they measure different aspects of the same phenomenon.33 
The last model, Model 7, is the most complex model, which includes all the individual-level 
variables as well as the macroeconomic measures together. The full model, Model 7 presented 
as equation:  
 
Yijk = β0 + β1X1ijk + β2X2ijk + β3X3ijk + β4X4ijk + β5X5ijk+ β6X6ijk + β7X7ijk 
+ β8X8ijk + β9X9ijk + β10X10jk + β11X11jk + β12X12jk + β13X13jk + β14X14jk+ + 
β15X15k   + eijk + u0jk + v0k 
 
Where β1, β2… βn is the slope for level-1 and level-2 variables X1ijk, X2ijk, Xnijk 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 To make sure this does not affect the results, it is tested for multicollinearity. The results from this test indicate 
that none of the variables correlate in a way that makes the results affected. 
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Table 9: Random intercept model with three levels: individual, country-year and country. 
Dependent variable: POLITICAL TRUST 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 9.595*** 9.133*** 9.518*** 5.739*** 10.87*** 10.26*** 7.870*** (.548) (.580) (.628) (.647) (.753) (.937) (.940) 
Level-1  
       Political interest 1.329*** 1.329*** 1.329*** 1.328*** 1.329*** 1.329*** 1.328*** (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
Voted last national 
electiona 
1.427*** 1.427*** 1.428*** 1.428*** 1.427*** 1.427*** 1.428*** 
(.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) 
Unemployedb  -.429***  -.428***  -.428***  -.428***  -.427***  -.428***  -.428*** (.077) (.077) (.077) (.077) (.077) (.077) (.077) 
Feeling about household's 
income nowadays 
.570*** .570*** .570*** .569*** .570*** .570*** .569*** 
(.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) 
Education .027*** .027*** .027*** .027*** .027*** .027*** .027*** (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Womanc .329*** .329*** .329*** .329*** .329*** .329*** .329*** (.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) 
Age  -.141***  -.141***  -.141***  -.141***  -.141***  -.141***  -.141*** (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Age squared .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Time control 
       2004d  
.789** .113 1.908*** .699** .640* 1.128** 
 
(.358) (.502) (.397) (.348) (.360) (.502) 
2006d  
.738** .002 1.306*** .626* .593* .457 
 
(.352) (.522) (.365) (.343) (.354) (.513) 
2008d  
.426  -.371 .281  -.035 .231  -.840 
 
(.337) (.539) (.343) (.356) (.350) (.543) 
Level-2 
       GDP growth level 
  
.094* 
   
.087* 
   
(.051) 
   
(.050) 
GDP per capita levele 
   
.109*** 
  
.107*** 
    
(.016) 
  
(.017) 
Unemployment level 
    
-.200*** 
 
 -.114* 
     
(.062) 
 
 (.063) 
GDP gross debt level 
     
-.021  -.013 
      
(.013) (.011) 
Random part               
Var (eijk) 
32.223 32.223 32.223 32.223 32.223 32.223 32.223 
(.118) (.118) (.118) (.118) (.118) (.118) (.118) 
Var (u0jk) 
1.524 1.400  1.304   1.441  1.309 1.317 1.272 
(.265) (.244) (.228)   (.252) (.230)  (.232) (.224) 
Var (v0k)  
6.669 6.580  7.039  2.051  5.266 (7.133) 1.890 
(2.013) (1.977)  (2.114) (.710)  (1.633)  (2.189) (.659) 
   Log Likelihood -472393 -472390 -472388 -472378 -472385 -472388 -472372 
 -2LL change 
 10827*** 
 
6.13 
  
9.36* 
3.23* 
24.16*** 
30.29*** 
15.92** 
9.78** 
 8.35* 
2.22 
40.85*** 
34.71*** 
a dummy variable with reference category did not vote last national election, b dummy variable with reference 
category employed, unemployed not looking for a job, permanently sick or disabled, retired, homemakers, under 
education, community or military service and others, c dummy variable with reference category men, d dummy 
variables with reference category 2010, e The variable is divided by 1000,  Level-1 N: 25, Level 2 N: 93 Level-3 N: 
149,640, Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  Model 3 - 6 is tested against both Model 
1 and 2, also -2LL change for Model 7 is tested against Model 3: 31.49***, Model 4: 10.55**, Model 5: 24.93*** 
and Model 6: 32.49*** 
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 In Model 7, all the level-1 variables are significant. First, high political interest 
generates high trust levels, and second, citizens who participate politically, by voting in 
national elections, have higher levels of political trust. The results of UNEMPLOYED indicates 
that citizens without work, but who are looking for a job, have less trust in political institutions 
compared to people who are either employed, unemployed, and not looking for a job, 
permanently sick, or disabled, under education, community, or military service. The 
demographic variables education, gender and age also seem to influence the degree of political 
trust. Increased years of education increase trust, and women have higher levels of trust 
compared to men. FEELING ABOUT HOUSEHOLD INCOME NOWADAYS has a positive correlation 
with POLITICAL TRUST, indicating that respondents that are living comfortably on present 
income have higher levels of political trust compared to respondents feeling that it is very 
difficult living on present income.  
 I expected the effect of age to decrease up to around 30 years, do to the high 
unemployment among young in many of European countries. However, this is not the effect I 
am finding, level of trust is decreasing to the age of 70.5 for then to start increasing again. The 
effect of age is illustrated in Figure A9 in Appendix. The effects of the demographic variables 
AGE, WOMAN and EDUCATION are constant in all models, meaning that they are not correlating 
with the macro variables. When including unemployment in Model 5,34 the effect of being 
unemployed decreases, indicating that when these macroeconomic variables are not included, 
the effects of these are partially shown through the measure UNEMPLOYED.35  The same effect 
can be seen with FEELING ABOUT HOUSEHOLD'S INCOME NOWADAYS and POLITICAL INTEREST 
when controlled for GDP in Model 4 and Model 7. Both measures are reduced by .001, a small 
change, but indicate a confounder effect.  Even if this is the case, the level-1 variables are not 
changing in a severe way through the different models. 
 The time control variables 2004, 2006, and 2008 measures levels of trust in these years 
compared to 2010. It shows the unexplained variance in political trust when controlling for the 
other micro- and macro variables. The effect for 2004 indicates in each of the models, that the 
trust level is higher in 2004 compared to 2010. The same effect manifests itself between 2006 
and 2010 as well. For the comparison between 2008 and 2010 the effect varies when 
controlling for different measures. In Model 2, where none of the economic measures are 
included, as well as Model 4 and Model 6, the effect is positive, indicating that levels of trust 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 And also when including the dummy variables for time in model 2. 
35 This effect is called a confounder, or hidden variable, meaning that a third variable holds some of the effect of 
another X-variable and its effect on Y. 
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are higher in 2008. However, when controlling for growth level in Model 3 and unemployment 
level in Model 5, the effect indicates that trust-levels are lower in 2008 compared to 2010. In 
the final model, when all economic indicators are included, the dummy variable 2008, indicate 
that levels of trust are lower in 2008 compared to 2010. Meaning that the unexplained variance 
in Y, the variance not explained in the final model, gives increased trust from 2008 to 2010. The 
effect of the 2008 dummy variable fluctuates around zero and is not significant. Therefore, no 
conclusions can be drawn from this measure.   
 As mentioned before, the different economic measures are included one by one from 
Model 3 through 6 and together in Model 7. This is done to control if some of the measures 
have different effects alone, compared to when they are combined with other measures. It is 
also necessary to control for all the macro-variables together, because they are all measures of 
the crisis effect. From Model 3, where the level of GDP GROWTH is tested by itself, it is 
indicated that an increase in GDP GROWTH LEVEL increases POLITICAL TRUST. It has the same 
effect when controlled for together with the other economic indicators. This confirms that 
people trust governments more if they have shown a capacity to generate economic growth 
(Fiorina 1978; Mackuen et al. 1992), and confirms the hypothesis H1: A high positive GDP 
growth rate is associated with high level of political trust. 
 In Model 4 it is controlled for the effect of GDP PER CAPITA. High levels of GDP are 
correlated with high levels of POLITICAL TRUST. From Model 7, the effect is the same, meaning 
that the higher level of GDP a country has, the higher the levels of political trust will be. GDP 
per capita gives a country’s standard average of living, and can bee seen as an indicator on 
welfare. If GDP goes down, the standard average goes down as well, and naturally citizens trust 
and satisfaction in political institutions goes down. Hypothesis H2: A high level of GDP per 
capita leads to high levels of political trust is confirmed. 
 In their study on confidence in political and private institutions Listhaug and Wiberg 
(1995) find that in many countries, where unemployment has increased, it has contributed to 
reduced support. Therefore, it is expected that high unemployment rate correlates with low 
levels of political trust. From Model 5 and Model 7 it is indicated that this assumption correct. 
UNEMPLOYMENT LEVEL has a negative correlation with POLITICAL TRUST. Hypothesis H3: A 
low level of unemployment is associated with high political trust, is correct, and can be 
confirmed.  
 When GDP GROSS DEBT LEVEL is added as the only macroeconomic measure, it is 
indicated that an increase in gross debt in percent of GDP is correlating with low levels of 
political trust. The same is indicated from Model 7. However, the measure is not significant in 
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any of the models. One possibility for the lack of significance may be that GDP debt level only 
affects the trust in the COUNTRIES PARLIAMENT, because the citizens blame the government in 
charge for the economic situation. To test this I have conducted a sensitivity model where 
POLITICAL TRUST is replaced by one of the three scale components TRUST IN COUNTRIES 
PARLIAMENT.36 The findings are the same as in the main table, that the level of GDP GROSS 
DEBT does not have any significance effect. However, as discussed in section 3.2, the three 
measures that together represent political trust, have a very high Chronbach’s alpha, indicating 
that the three measures may be too similar. This may again produce the same results when 
testing each component alone. From this I am not able to confirm H4: High GDP debt in 
percent of GDP in a country will lead to a lower level of political trust. 
 In the final model, where all the macroeconomic measures are included together, the 
effect on all of them becomes smaller, compared to when controlled for alone. This is because 
controlled for together, a larger number of degrees of freedom, in addition to the fact that they 
measure the same phenomenon - the economic situation in a country. To find the model that 
best explains the variation in political trust, the -2LL change test is used. From this, it is 
indicated that when adding GDP GROWTH, GDP PER CAPITA or UNEMPLOYMENT in Model 3, 4, 
and 5, the variance in POLITICAL TRUST is better explained if compared to the model where 
only individual level variables are included.37 This indicates that the economic indicators 
explain the effect of an economic crisis better, compared to the time control variables. Model 7, 
where all the macroeconomic variables are controlled for together, explains more of the 
variance in political trust, compared to all previous models. When controlling for all the 
individual-level variables as well as the macroeconomic measures together, the variation in 
political trust is best explained. From this model, the indicators used, do not measure the 
economic crisis and its effect, but rather how the correlation between them and political trust is. 
This is also important to answer the research question, because it illustrates if economic 
performance has an effect on levels of POLITICAL TRUST. However, to be able to directly test 
the effect of an economic crisis on political trust, it is necessary to control for the change in the 
economic indicators. By creating new macro variables that measure change from one year to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 When dividing the dependent variable, one sensitivity table is made for each of the three components; TRUST IN 
COUNTRY’S PARLIAMENT, TRUST IN POLITICIANS and TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES. These tables are shown in Table 
C3, C4 and C5. The results from illustrate that all macroeconomic measures have the same relationship with the 
dependent as they have with POLITICAL TRUST. All have a weaker correlation, but this is to be expected because it 
is more variation, better distribution, and therefore more to explain in POLITICAL TRUST compared to each 
component separated. In addition to this, the table when the dependent variable is TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES, 
growth level is no longer significant.  37	  They are also better if compared to if the time control variables are added.	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the next, I am able to test if the changes the financial crisis has had on the economic measures, 
affects levels of trust. This is what I have done in the section beneath. 
4.2 How does the financial crisis effect on macroeconomic measures affect 
political trust? 
In this section the economic indicators measure, as mentioned above, the change in the 
variables from one year to the next. As a consequence of the crisis, many of these indicators 
have taken a turn to the worse. By measuring the change, this will be taken into account. 
 Because it is used the same sample and level-1 variables, the empty model, Model 1 and 
Model 2 are identical in both Table 9, and Table 10. Therefore they are not included in the table 
beneath. This indicates therefore that the effects of the individual-level variables are the same. 
Model 3 through 6 adds the macro measures one by one, like in the previous models. Also in 
this table, the last model is the most complex model, and includes all the individual-level 
variables and all the macroeconomic measures together. The full model in this table presented 
as equation:  
 
Yijk = β0 + β1X1ijk + β2X2ijk + β3X3ijk + β4X4ijk + β5X5ijk+ β6X6ijk + β7X7ijk + 
β8X8ijk + β9X9ijk + β10X10jk + β11X11jk + β12X12jk + β13X13jk + β14X14jk+ + 
β15X15k   + eijk + u0jk + v0k 
 
Where β1, β2… βn is the slope for level-1 and level-2 variables X1ijk, X2ijk, Xnijk. I will start this 
section by commenting on what happens to the individual-level variables, when including these 
macroeconomic measures. This is followed by a discussion on the effects of the economic 
indicators. Last, I will look at the change in Log Likelihood to find out which of the models 
explain most of the variance in POLITICAL TRUST.  
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Table 10: Random intercept model with three levels: individual, country-year and country. 
Dependent variable: POLITICAL TRUST 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 9.748*** 9.177*** 9.538*** 9.484*** 10.60*** (.680) (.574) (.615) (.608) (.734) 
Level-1 
     Political interest 1.329*** 1.329*** 1.329*** 1.329*** 1.329*** (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
Voted last national electiona 1.428*** 1.427*** 1.427*** 1.427*** 1.428*** (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) (.039) 
Unemployedb -.428*** -.428*** -.427*** -.428*** -.427*** (.077) (.077) (.077) (.077) (.077) 
Feeling about household's income nowadays .570*** .570*** .570*** .570*** .570*** (.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) 
Education .027*** .027*** .027*** .027*** .027*** (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Womanc .329*** .329*** .329*** .329*** .329*** (.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) 
Age -.141*** -.141*** -.141*** -.141*** -.141*** (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Age squared .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Time control 
     2004d .154 .563 .415 .424 -.939 (.509) (.468) (.374) (.398) (.687) 
2006d .065 .536 .268 .280 -1.157* (.522) (.444) (.387) (.419) (.702) 
2008d -.247 .174 -.293 -.052 -1.675** (.512) (.474) (.439) (.414) (.732) 
Level-2 
     GDP Growth change .074*    
.103** 
(.043) 
   
(.046) 
GDP per Capita changee  
.033 
  
.041 
 
(.043) 
  
(.043) 
Unemployment change   
-.183** 
 
-.093 
  
(.076) 
 
(.083) 
GDP Gross Debt change    
-.038* -.038* 
   
(.020) (.021) 
Random part           
Var (eijk) 
32.223 32.223 32.223 32.223 32.223 
(.118) (.118) (.118) (.118) (.118) 
Var (u0jk) 
1.340 1.408 1.263 1.327 1.182 
(.234) (.247) (.221) (.231) (.209) 
Var (v0k)  
6.601 6.309 7.055 6.618 6.557 
(1.978) (1.936) (2.111) (1.983) (2.006) 
   Log Likelihood -472388 -472389 -472387 -472388 -472384 
 -2LL change 
9.03* 
2.90* 
6.69 
0.56 
11.49** 
5.36** 
9.65** 
3.51* 
17.72** 
11.58** 
a dummy variable with reference category did not vote last national election b dummy variable with reference 
category employed, unemployed not looking for a job, permanently sick or disabled, retired, homemakers under 
education, community or military service and others c dummy variable with reference category men d dummy 
variables with reference category 2010 e The variable is divided by 1000.  Level-1 N: 25, Level 2 N: 93 Level-3 N: 
149,640, Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Model 3 through 6 is tested against both 
Model 1 and 2, also -2LL change for Model 7 is tested against Model 3: 8.69**, Model 4: 11.03**, Model 5: 6.22 
and Model 6: 8.07** 
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When controlling for UNEMPLOYMENT in Model 5, the effect of being unemployed decreases 
by .001, this indicates that when UNEMPLOYMENT CHANGE is not included, the effect of 
UNEMPLOYMENT CHANGE is partially shown through the measure UNEMPLOYED38. 
 The time control measures in the final model show that after controlling for the 
measures included in Model 7, POLITICAL TRUST is lower in both 2006, and 2008, compared to 
2010. This illustrates that the variance that is not taken into account indicates that political trust 
is higher in 2010, compared to both 2008 and 2006. The same difference is indicated between 
2004 and 2010 as well, but this effect is not significant. 
 Two of the measures are significant in the final model: GROWTH CHANGE and DEBT 
CHANGE. From both model 3 and 7, GROWTH CHANGE has a positive correlation with political 
trust. This indicates that in countries where growth has decreased between 2008 and 2010, 
citizen’s trust has also decreased. From Table 3, it is illustrated that all countries in the sample 
have experienced a negative change in GROWTH between 2008 and 2010. This is in line with 
the hypothesis H6: A decreased GDP growth rate, as a consequence of the financial crisis, will 
reduce citizens’ political trust. Therefore, the hypothesis can be confirmed. The effect of 
GROWTH CHANGE in Model 7, where the measure is combined with the other macro measures, 
is stronger and more significant. This will be discussed further later in this section. 
 From Model 6, it is indicated that an increase in debt results in lower political trust. This 
is as expected from hypothesis H7: An increase in GDP gross debt leads to reduced political 
trust. The effect is unchanged when controlling for all economic indicators together.39 The 
hypothesis can therefore be confirmed. There is evidence that suggest that the change in debt 
decreases citizens political trust, and also that the financial crisis has, through increased debt-
levels in many European countries, reduced levels of trust in political institutions. 
  The effect of a change in GDP from Model 4, indicate a positive effect, as expected, 
meaning that a positive change generates higher trust. The effect is the same in Model 7, but 
since the effect is not significant in either of the models hypothesis H5: A decrease in GDP per 
capita will result in reduced political trust, cannot be confirmed. 
 UNEMPLOYMENT CHANGE indicates that a decrease in unemployment will give 
increased political trust, which is consistent with the hypothesis H8: Increase in unemployment 
reduces citizen’s political trust. However, when controlling for unemployment together with 
the other economic indicators, the effect of the measure is reduced, and no longer significant.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  The same happens to the effect of VOTED LAST NATIONAL ELECTION when including GROWTH CHANGE.	  39	  This indicates that this measure doesn’t correlate with the other economic measures.	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 It is a possibility that the reason why change in GDP and unemployment is not 
significant is because the data used to measure the effect is to close to the crisis to have an 
effect. It is a known phenomenon that unemployment moves counter-cyclical with GDP and is 
a lagging indicator. Research on this has been found to suggest that unemployment drags the 
gross domestic product by about two quarters (Brandal 2012). Therefore, since GDP CHANGE is 
not significant, this may be the reason why UNEMPLOYMENT is not in the final model either. It 
is only used data for one year when the countries are experiencing a crisis, 2010, which may be 
to soon after the crisis to get significant results. Even though the results aren’t significant, the 
effect of the two measures is as expected. In 2010, unemployment levels, as a consequence of 
the financial crisis, have not reached its highest level yet. Unemployment levels per March 
2013 show that 18 of the 25 countries are experiencing higher unemployment today, compared 
to the levels used in this data, see Table A2. For Spain, the unemployment rate is 27.20 percent, 
which is an increase on about 9.80 percent, compared to the level in 2010. For Greece 
unemployment rate today is 27.20 compared to 12.5 in 2010. Cyprus has three times as high 
unemployment, while for Bulgaria, Croatia and Netherlands the unemployment is doubled, and 
several other countries have also experienced severe increase compared to 2010. This effect I 
am not able to control for here. If unemployment lags behind GDP per capita with about two 
quarters, and it also takes time before this affects the levels of political trust, it may still be 
years before it is possible to find this effect in the data.  
 However, because it is significant when controlled for alone, another possibility may be 
that that the effect of unemployment is shown through the other economic indicators. As 
mentioned before, GROWTH CHANGE increases when included in the final model. It may be that 
the effect of unemployment is shown through this measure in the final model. The measures 
are, as mentioned before, indicators on the economic situation in a country, and therefore this is 
a possible explanation.  
 When including economic indicators to the regression the variance in POLITICAL TRUST 
is better explained compared when controlling for only individual-level measures.40 This is true 
for all economic variables alone (except GDP per capita change), and also when controlling for 
all the economic measures together in Model 7. When comparing the final model to Model 3 
through 6, the -2LL change test indicates that this model is better, compared to the models 
where each macro variable is included alone. One exception to this is Model 5, where 
UNEMPLOYMENT is tested by it selves. From this it is indicated that UNEMPLOYMENT, when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 And also when it is included time control variables as well in Model 2.  
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included as the only macroeconomic measure, explains political trust, just as good as Model 7. 
This indicates that H8: Increase in unemployment reduces citizen’s political trust, is true.  
 To summarize, by including measures on economic performance, political trust is better 
explained, compared to when they’re not included. Also, from this it is evidence that suggest 
that the financial crisis have had an impact on citizen’s confidence in political institutions.  
4.3 The relationship between actual economic performance and individual 
perception of economic performance 
According to Dalton (2004) evidence suggests individual’s perception of state of the economy 
may be just as important at as the actual situation in the economy. From the two previous 
tables, it is indicated that citizens have information about the state of the economy. If for 
example level of unemployment had increased and nobody except those who was affected by 
the increase, was aware of it, level of unemployment probably wouldn’t have had a significant 
effect on political trust. The same can be said for the effect of both level of growth and GDP. It 
is therefore good reason to believe that individuals’ perceptions of the economic situation are 
important for their level of trust. In this section I have therefore added, to the two previous 
tables, a measure for individual’s satisfaction with the economy.  
 This measure is not included in the two previous tables for three reasons. The first 
reason is that individual’s perceptions will, at least partially, be affected by the actual economic 
situation. This means that this individual measure will be affected by both the level of and 
change in the macroeconomic indicators. The second reason for not including it in the main 
models is that the measure correlates, to some degree, with POLITICAL TRUST, and scores high 
on the same component. For results from the principal component analysis see Appendix B. 
The third reason for not including this measure in the tables above is that, even though there are 
theoretical reasons for including it, it may contain errors that I am not able to control for. It is 
for example a possibility that this measure contains not only perception of the economic 
situation, but also perception of the state of health services or other similar questions regarding 
attitudes. One should always be careful including an attitude measure as independent variable, 
when studying an attitude. However, the causal relationship, if including individuals 
perceptions on the economic situation, is expected to be as followed: 
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Figure 6: Including individual perception to the theoretical relationship 
  
 Tables A4 and A5, included in the appendix indicate that several of the economic 
indicators correlate41 with the variable measuring individual’s perception.42 It is therefore good 
reason to test the effect of economic performance the way I have done, by first controlling for 
level and change in macroeconomic measure alone in Table 9 and 10, for then to add the 
measure on individual perception.43 
 As can be seen in Table C1 and C2, the individual-level variable is significant and 
indicating that personal perception of the state in the economy is an important component in 
level of political trust. The measure indicates, as expected, that the more satisfied citizens are 
with the state of the economy, the higher political trust he or she has. The results from this 
model also illustrate, as expected, that when including this measure, only one of the 
macroeconomic measures has a significant effect. It can be argued that this is because 
individual’s perception about the state of the economy is formed by the actual situation. If this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Both GDP LEVEL and GDP CHANGE have a high positive correlation with perceptions of the national economy in a 
country, where level of GDP, correlates a bit stronger, compared to change in GDP. This is in thread with the 
results from Table 9 and 10. Also, the correlation between UNEMPLOYMENT LEVEL and HOW SATISFIED WITH 
PRESENT STATE OF ECONOMY IN COUNTRY is stronger than the correlation between UNEMPLOYMENT CHANGE and 
this measure. This is also what Table 9 and 10 illustrate. The correlation coefficient between HOW SATISFIED WITH 
PRESENT STATE OF ECONOMY IN COUNTRY and GROWTH LEVEL indicates that it is a very weak correlation between 
these two measures. The same can be said when looking at GROWTH CHANGE, only this indicates some stronger 
correlation. DEBT CHANGE has a stronger correlation with perception of national economy compared to DEBT 
LEVEL, but in both cases, the correlation is weak.	  
42 To test the correlation between the macroeconomic measures and HOW SATISFIED WITH PRESENT STATE OF 
ECONOMY IN COUNTRY, the individual measure is aggregated. When aggregating, I subtract the mean value of how 
satisfied the individuals with the state of the economy in a country-year. This is done to test the correlation 
between the variables on the same level. 
43 Tolerance values are also tested see Tables A6 and A7 From this it is indicated that it is not a problem with 
multicollinearity when controlling for both the individual-level measure, and the macroeconomic measures 
together. 
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is correct, the measure HOW SATISFIED WITH PRESENT STATE OF ECONOMY IN COUNTRY will 
be affected by how the macro-level indicators change. Therefore, when this measure is 
controlled for, the effects of the different macroeconomic indicators may be visible only 
through this variable.  
 There are reasons to be careful when concluding on basis of this measure because of 
previously mentioned problems,44 however, the results support Dalton’s (2004) findings that 
individual perception of economic situation is an important factor in citizen’s political trust. 
They may also be more important than the macroeconomic measures and the actual situation. 
4.4 Testing for the effect of inflation 
As a sensitivity analysis, INFLATION is also included as a macro-variable. From previously 
discussed research (Nannestad and Paldam 1994; Roth et al 2011), inflation has been indicated 
to be of importance to levels of trust. INFLATION, a rise in the overall level of prices, is 
measured by the consumer price index and reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to 
the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed 
at specified intervals, such as yearly.45 I have tested the effect of INFLATION LEVEL, as well as 
change in INFLATION rate. In the first model, where level of inflation is measured, it is coded 
into a dummy variable using countries inflation target.46 Values close to the countries inflation 
target (+/- 1 percent) are given the value 0, and inflation/deflation outside this interval is coded 
to 1. By doing this, inflation (or deflation in some cases) above or below the acceptable level, 
will be compared to an acceptable degree of inflation. A concern with measuring inflation 
through a dummy variable is that the amount of variation in the measure is small. Inflation 
targets are very similar in most countries, and identical in the Euro zone. Therefore, I am not 
able measure inflation in a satisfactory way, and it is only included as a sensitivity model.  For 
the second table the change in inflation from a given year to the next is measured.  
 Table A3 illustrates that seven of the 25 countries have experienced deflation, or falling 
prices, which is the opposite of inflation. Today, wages are dropping in Europe, as 
unemployment rises, which may bring a reduction in the price of important items in the 
consumer price index (CPI), which is used to measure inflation. During a recession and a 
depression, the greatest threat is deflation (or disinflation), and not inflation. This is what is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Because the variable scores high on the dependent variable, it is natural that it also gives strong effects when 
included in a regression model.	  
45 The Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
46	  For the countries in the European Union, the European Central Bank has sat an inflation target at 1.9 percent 
(European Central Bank no date and Atkins 2011). Norway has a target at 2.5 percent (Norges Bank 2001), Russia 
5 – 6 percent, Ukraine 7.9 and for the other countries not included in the EU, the target is around 2 percent.	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happening in the seven countries mentioned above. Also, inflation much higher than the target 
will probably reduce citizen’s trust because this indicates that the government is not working 
properly (Nannestad and Paldam 1994).  
 From Table C4 and C5, when inflation is added to both the level and change models, I 
find that level of inflation does not have a significant effect, while the change in inflation does. 
In Table C4, where INFLATION LEVEL is included, there are indications that an inflation rate 
with a deviation higher than one percent from inflation target correlates with lower levels of 
political trust. However, this is not significant, and it is not possible to conclude that level of 
inflation has an impact on levels of trust. When controlling for a change in inflation rate in 
Table C5, the significant results indicate that a change in inflation will decrease levels of trust. 
However, because both low and high levels of inflation will be regarded as negative, it is hard 
to make conclusions on the effects of inflation on political trust.  
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5. Discussion 
The findings suggest that there is evidence that economic performance does affect political 
trust. It is possible to assume that when the economy is working well, levels of political trust 
are higher, compared to when the economy is weak. From the tables in chapter 2.6, it is 
evidence that many of the countries have experienced a negative shift in the economy. 
However, from the models testing level, it is not possible to draw inferences about the recent 
economic crisis and its impact on trust. The second table is included to test directly if the crisis 
has reduced people’s political trust. From this table evidence suggests, that in countries affected 
by the crisis, citizens’ confidence is reduced.  
 When comparing the findings from Table 9 and 10, some interesting effects become 
visible. First of all, GDP growth rate, which is often used to assess the performance of the 
economy from year to year, does affect political trust. These findings suggest that low or 
reduced economic growth contributes to a lower political trust. It is therefore possible to 
conclude that citizens in countries that have experienced negative or reduced growth in GDP, 
as a consequence of the crisis, will have lower confidence.  
 Second, when an economy is affected like many economies have been because of the 
financial crisis, output gets below its natural level. This is illustrated in Table 2. One would 
assume that reduced GDP, which is a consequence of the financial crisis, would affect the 
degree of political support. The results suggest that a country’s GDP is important for degree of 
political trust, but that a change in GDP, doesn’t affect levels of trust. This indicates that 
citizens living in countries with high GDP have higher trust in political institutions, compared 
to countries with low GDP. This is probably because these countries have higher standards of 
living, and citizens are more satisfied with their life situation in general, which also will be 
reflected through higher levels of trust. However, the impact the financial crisis has had on 
GDP between 2008 and 2010 does not seem to have reduced the citizen’s trust.  
 Third, is indicated that the higher the unemployment rate, the higher level of trust. This 
means that unemployment affect confidence. However, I find two different results when testing 
for if the financial crisis’ effect on unemployment, has affected political trust. When controlling 
for the change in unemployment as the only economic indicator in the model, the results 
indicate that the financial crisis has had an effect on political trust. However, unemployment 
can not be said to affect confidence when including debt, GDP and growth together with 
unemployment. I assumed that the change in unemployment between 2008 and 2010 would 
have a strong and significant effect, as unemployment rates have increased severely in the 
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aftermath of the crisis. Still, as discussed above, to little time may have passed between when 
the crisis occurred, to when the data where collected, meaning it is to early to see if 
unemployment have affected levels of trust. Also, unemployment has a direct effect on the 
welfare of the unemployed, but not necessarily on employed citizens. A possibility is that 
countries that have not been as severely affected by the crisis, like for example Greece and 
Spain, “disturb” the effect of the measure. When comparing the difference between Greece and 
Norway, it is clear that the crisis has had very different effects across Europe.  
 Fourth, the results regarding debt in percent of GDP indicate that countries with a 
higher debt have lower levels of trust. Still, this can not be said with absolute certainty because 
this finding is not significant. However, from the results I find that the financial crisis’ effect on 
debt between 2008, and 2010, have affected political trust in countries where the debt has 
increased. This illustrate, as mentioned before, as the financial crisis has evolved into a debt 
crisis, illustrating this measures relevance. This can indicate that debt does not affect 
confidence when the economy is working efficiently, but during a crisis, debt is something 
people are concerned about.  
 
Table 11: Predicted values on POLITICAL TRUST using mean values 
on all independent variables, except GDP GROSS DEBT.  
 2008 2010 
Spain 9.72 8.79 
Norway  9.12 9.76 
Greece 9.18 8.57 
Ireland 8.80 7.65 
Ukraine 9.67 8.39 
United Kingdom 9.39 8.54 
 
Table 11 illustrates predicted degree of POLITICAL TRUST in Spain, Norway, Greece, Ireland, 
Ukraine and United Kingdom.47 Degree of political trust decreases in Spain, Greece, Ireland, 
Ukraine and United Kingdom, while it increases in Norway. By comparing these results to 
Table 4, level of debt increases in all these countries, except from in Norway, where the debt 
decreases. It is possible to conclude that when the financial crisis made the debt increase, this 
resulted in lower levels of trust through Europe.   
 The findings discussed above, illustrate how the economic situation affects confidence 
levels, but as indicated from both Dalton (2004) and Huseby (1999), individual perception of 
economic performance is also important. When testing for this the results indicate that also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 When using mean values on all individual-level variables, as well as for GROWTH, UNEMPLOYMENT and GDP, 
letting only GDP GROSS DEBT vary. 
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perception of economic performance affects levels of support. By using Ringdal (2013: 329f), 
it is possible to assume that the causal chain between the macroeconomic indicators and 
individual perception is as followed:  
 
Figure 7: Causal chain between economic situation, perception of economic situation and 
political trust 
 
 
If ignoring the grey chain, the figure illustrates the effect I am seeing in the results. I assume 
that the effects of the macroeconomic measures are shown through individual’s perception of 
economic performance. According to Ringdal (2013), in extreme cases the effect of Z 
disappears when controlling for X. The only effect that is significant when including this 
measure is GDP per capita level. In this case the grey chain illustrates that actual situation is an 
intervening factor, but does not explain the full relation between perception of economic 
performance and political trust.   
  The measure on individual’s perception has, as mentioned before, problems that need to 
be taken into account. The biggest concern is that it scores high on the same component as 
political trust, indicating that they measure the same phenomenon. If they are used in a 
regression model, with one measure as the dependent and the other one as an independent 
variable, it will result in a high correlation. It is therefore a possibility that the effect of the 
measure on individual perception is larger, compared to in reality. If these problems are 
overlooked, the results indicate the same as both Dalton (2004) and Huseby’s (1999) research 
suggests. Individual’s perception of economic achievements seems to exert a direct impact on 
people's perception of the government, and may be more important than the economic numbers 
and the real economic situation. If citizens are pessimistic (or optimistic) about the economy 
and their personal economic situation, then these perceptions may be linked to political support. 
 When excluding individual perception, the actual situation is important, but as 
discussed, individual perception also seems to be an important factor in levels of trust. Because 
most of the variation in political trust exists between individuals, these results seem to be 
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correct. However, as individual’s perception is partially affected by the actual economic 
situation, this suggests that the actual economic situation is of importance as well.  
 When testing the relationship between individual perception and the macroeconomic 
measures, the results indicated a correlation between them. The correlation is high enough to 
validate testing models both with, and without, the variable measuring individual perception. 
However, the measures do not correlate perfectly, which indicates a possible deviation between 
individual perception and economic reality. This is natural because people perceive things 
differently depending on, among other, their life situation and how enlightened they are. If it 
exist a gap between citizens’ expectations and the actual situation, this should not be ignored. It 
is possible to apply Davies (1962) “J-curve” theory,48 to this deviation. The theory seeks to 
explain the rise of revolutionary movements in terms of rising individual expectations and 
falling levels of perceived welfare. According to Davies (1962): 
 
Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and 
social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The all-important effect 
on the minds of people in a particular society is to produce, during the former period, an 
expectation of continued ability to satisfy needs – which continue to rise – and, during the 
latter, a mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from 
anticipated reality. The actual state of socio-economic development is less significant than 
the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and must continue in the future 
(Davies 1962: 6). 
  
 A revolution is seen as a subjective response to a sudden reversal in fortunes after a long 
period of economic growth, which is known as relative deprivation.49 By connecting this to 
what has happened in many European countries, as a consequence of the economic crisis, there 
are possible repercussions to the crisis, which needs to be taken seriously. There have been 
demonstrations in several countries showing citizen’s dissatisfaction against the measures taken 
by governments to prevent for example a rise in unemployment. On May 4th 2013, The 
Economist wrote:  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Which is often used to explain social unrest and efforts by governments to contain this unrest.  It is referred to as 
“J-Curve”, because economic development followed by a depression would be modeled as an upside down and 
slightly skewed J (Davies 1962). 
49 Relative deprivation theory claims that frustrated expectations help overcome the collective action problem, 
which in this case may breed revolt. Frustrated expectations could result from several factors, including growing 
levels of inequality within a country, which may mean that those who are increasingly poor relative to the rich are 
getting less than they expected, or a period of sustained economic development, lifting general expectations, 
followed by a crisis (Walker and Smith 2001). 
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The protesters were back in Syntagma square on May 1st, a disquieting reminder of the 
pressures facing the nearly one-year-old coalition government as it strives to meet the 
terms of Greece’s second bail-out. These strains will intensify if the economy remains 
stuck in recession. So how plausible are sightings of an economic recovery on the 
horizon (The Economist 2013)? 
 
This illustrates the current situation in Greece. I do not believe we are heading towards a 
revolution, but the theory describes what could happen if the deviation between expectations 
and actual development changes suddenly.  
 Blind (2006) argues that symptoms do not explain the causes of declining trust, and 
many different factors may be behind a decline. One factor behind a decline might be concern 
that the government is incapable of dealing with current fiscal and financial challenges. This is 
important because this indicate that it might not be, for example unemployment directly that is 
the cause, but the way governments have handled the crisis. It is a possibility that people are 
not just upset with the economic outcomes, but also in the way European policy-makers have 
handled the crisis, as it has been, many would argue, ineffective. If this is the correct, this might 
be what is undermining the confidence, and not the actual economic conditions.  
 Another option is that the European electorate recognizes that the crisis was instigated 
abroad, by an unwieldy banking sector, and therefore does not blame their own government for 
the crisis. Even though the crisis did not start in Europe, Greece for example, had a high 
budged deficit, and people were living far beyond its means before the crisis occurred (BBC 
2012). Government concealed much of this borrowing, as they sought to meet the three 
percent-of-GDP cap on borrowing that is required of members of the euro collaboration.  
 Also, the European governments spend much of their energy protecting the Euro, and 
less on stimulating to job creation. Obama also pointed this out by stating in June of 2012:  
“Over the longer term, even as European countries with large debt burdens carry out necessary 
fiscal reforms, they’ve also got to promote economic growth and job creation” (Obama 2012). 
This is difficult to capture empirically from the results, but it needs to be considered as a 
possible cause for declined confidence. In this thesis I find that economic performance has an 
impact on citizen’s trust, and also that the financial crisis has contributed to decreased levels of 
trust in countries affected by it. However, the mechanisms behind the crisis are many and 
complicated. I can therefore not state with absolute certainty, that it is the macroeconomic 
measures directly that have had an impact on trust.  
 Another aspect to this is that the economic crisis has hit some countries harder than 
others. Means that the differences between countries in the sample may be large.50 According 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  The VPC illustrated that around 10 percent of the variance in political trust exist between countries. 
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to Roth (2010: 2), levels of trust have been reduced more in Spain and Portugal compared to 
France and Germany. As seen from Figure 4, Greece and the other Mediterranean countries 
have felt the severity of the crisis in a larger degree than for example the Scandinavian 
countries. I have therefore tested the effect of both level and change, for each macroeconomic 
indicator51 for the Mediterranean countries.52 These effects are for most indicators stronger. 
Interestingly, the counties level of debt in percent of GDP is significant, which was not the case 
when all countries were tested in Table 9. Also, when testing for how the change in debt affects 
confidence, this does not have a significant effect, as it did when controlling for the whole 
sample. It is a possibility that this is because the debt has been quite high in these countries 
before the crisis occurred as well. See Table 5.  
 The final question that needs to be answered is; do the findings stem from a decline that 
has, according to previous research, been happening for a long time, or has the financial crisis 
affected levels of trust? From the results there is evidence that suggest that the financial crisis 
has contributed to a decline in political trust in countries severely affected by it. The crisis may 
not have reduced political trust levels in Norway to the same degree as it has in Greece or 
Spain, but there are evidence suggesting the importance of economic performance. The 
composition of the causes and effects is complex. As discussed before, it is not necessarily an 
effect of the economic indicators, but rather an effect of the measures implemented by the 
government, that is the actual reason behind a decline in trust. It is hard to say for certain as it is 
a very complicated and complex issue. However, if it is the effect of worsening changes in the 
macro indicators or austerity measures, they are both consequences of the crisis, and a decrease 
in trust can then be connected to the financial crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51 Due to number of degrees of freedom, it is not possible to include more than one macro variable at the time. I 
am therefore not able to find the effect when all economic measures are combined. 	  52	  See Tables C6 and C7.	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6. Conclusion  
Trust links ordinary citizens to the institutions that are intended to represent them (Bianco 
1994), and thereby enhancing both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of democratic 
government (Gamson 1968; Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Hetherington 1998). It is therefore an 
essential part of a democratic system, and should not be overlooked. Findings made in this 
thesis suggest that the financial crisis has in fact reduced citizen’s trust in political institutions, 
at least in countries where the crisis has had a severe impact. This may be because of the way 
the crisis has been handled in many of the countries. In for example Spain and Greece, people 
are experiencing severe budget deficits and economic stagnation, and the situation does not 
seem to be improving. Both economies remain in recession, limiting the prospects for 
improvements in the job market. By continuing in this economic downturn, the repercussions 
may be that citizens no longer want to live by the democratic ideals their society is build upon. 
In addition to riots in many countries, we have also seen an increase in more rightist or populist 
movements (Lachman 2010).  
 In this thesis I sat out to give an answer to if economic performance affect political 
trust, and if the financial crisis has decreased confidence levels, due to the severity of its 
consequences. When testing the relationship between degree or level of unemployment, debt, 
growth and GDP, and political trust, the findings suggest, that economic performance does 
impact levels of confidence. Second, I find indications that suggest that the crisis has, in 
countries severely affected by it, led to a decline in political trust. If the significant results are 
due to the actual increase/or decrease in the macroeconomic indicators used, or because of the 
way the policy makers have handled the crisis, is not possible to answer with absolute certainty. 
However, if political trust has declined as a consequence of the indicators used or the austerity 
measures, it is still a consequence of the financial crisis. 
 As previous research find that levels of trust have been declining for a long time, I 
included several measure points before the crisis occurred. By including 2004 and 2006 I am 
able to control for a possible negative trend as well. The results from Figure 4, suggest that not 
all countries in Europe have had a severe decline after 2008. A severe decline would indicate 
an effect of the crisis. The countries in which I find have had a decline in trust after the crisis, is 
the Mediterranean countries, which is sensible, due to the fact that the periphery countries have 
been most exposed to the financial crisis.  
 Also, evidence suggests that it may be more variation in support within the countries, 
compared to what it is between them. By measuring individual’s perception of the economic 
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situation, this measure indicates that this may be just as important, or maybe more important, 
compared to the actual economic situation. In further research I would have tried to measure 
individual’s perception in a better way. Because of the problems with this variable, I am 
cautious with generalizing these findings to the population.    
 The causes and effects of an economic crisis are complex, and because of this it is 
difficult to estimate all contributing factors and get a complete and precise view of the 
situation. However, by testing one model with the level on each macroeconomic measure, and 
afterwards one model with the change in these measures, I am able to look at the context 
between how levels of trust correlate with the different degrees of these indicators, as well as 
how a change in them affects levels of trust. In further research I would also look for ways to 
estimate this complexity more precisely. By doing a multilevel analysis, I have been able to 
look at several European countries, but as the results suggests, the crisis has not affected all 
countries to the same extent. By doing a case study on the countries that have been severely 
affected by the crisis, the details surrounding each of these countries would have been assessed 
in more detail.   
 Another limitation I want to address is, that I only have data for one year during the 
crisis.  This is a possible challenge with the data used. The last round of ESS is collected in 
2010–2011, which might be too close to the crisis in order to see the full effect. When a crisis 
occurs, some time has to go by before it affects the economic indicators. At the same time, it 
takes a while before these indicators affects individual’s confidence and attitudes. It may 
therefore be too early to measure the full effect of the economic measures and how this has 
affected individual’s trust in political institutions. Unfortunately, there are no comparable data 
available for these countries at a later time. Another limitation as I only use one year to 
measure the crisis, the results might be a fluctuation form the trend. In further research I would 
recommend including the next wave of ESS as well.  
 In sum, this study contributes to the understanding of the relationship between 
economic performance and political trust, as well as, how citizen’s trust is affected by an 
economic crisis. By concluding that first of all, economic performance, and how governments 
handle the economy, is important for the citizens. Second, a severe economic crisis, like the 
financial crisis, must be taken seriously, because this as well, reduces citizen’s confidence and 
support in political institutions. It is their job as elected representatives to lead the economy out 
of the recession, and if they do not handle the economic situation, this provides a foundation for 
higher discontent. Today, in 2013, several years after the crisis started, many Europeans are 
still unemployed or underemployed, and according to Krugman (2012), at recent rates of 
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reaction, we will not be back to normal levels of employment until around 2020. This should 
indicate to the governments, that the austerity measures taken perhaps are not the right way to 
better the situation. I am not going to suggest what they ought to do, but rather let other do it 
for me. Reuters interviewed Enzo Bernardis, a protester in Italy on the 18th of May 2013, he 
said: “We hope that this government will finally start listening to us because we are losing our 
patience” (Reuters 2013), also reporters for CNN interviewed Gloria Rodriguez, another 
protesting to voice her anger over the austerity measures taken as a consequence of the 
financial crisis. She said: “It is a shame what the government does; they operate as a totalitarian 
government with their cuts that are affecting everyone, especially in the public sector. The 
inequality in this country is horrific” (Smith-Spark, Nyberg and Maestro 2013), and also  “We 
are angry and tired. This government doesn't listen to our calls for help” (Smith-Spark, Nyberg 
and Maestro 2013).  
 The Reuters wrote on may 27th that “The European Commission will further shift the 
EU's policy focus from austerity to structural reforms to revive growth when it presents 
economic recommendations for each member state on Wednesday” (Reuters 2013). It seems 
like the European policy-makers have changed its course.  
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics, graphs, correlations and, influence 
 
 
Figure A1: Political Trust in East European countries  
 
 
Figure A2: Political Trust in West European countries 
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Figure A3: Political Trust in Mediterranean countries 
 
 
 
Figure A4: Political Trust in Scandinavian countries 
 
 
Figure A5: Political Trust in United Kingdom and Ireland 
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Table A1: Collection periods for ESS rounds 2, 3, 4 and 5 
 
  ESS2 - 2004 ESS3 - 2006 ESS4 - 2008 ESS5 - 2010 
Belgium 04.10.04-31.01.05 23.10.06-19.02.07 13.11.08-20.03.09 11.10.10-06.05.11 
Bulgaria  -  20.11.06-10.01.07 06.03.09-31.05.09 17.12.10-28.03.11 
Switzerland 15.09.04-28.02.05 24.08.06-02.04.07 30.08.08-17.04.09 02.10.10-23.03.11 
Cyprus  - 02.10.06-10.12.06 29.09.08-21.12.08 01.01.11-21.06.11 
Czech Republic 01.10.04-13.12.04  - 08.06.09-08.07.09 20.01.11-08.03.11 
Germany 26.08.04-16.01.05 01.09.06-15.01.07 27.08.08-31.01.09 15.09.10-03.02.11 
Denmark 09.10.04-31.01.05 19.09.06-02.05.07 01.09.08-11.01.09 20.09.10-31.01.11 
Estonia 30.09.04-19.01.05 25.10.06-21.05.07 05.11.08-11.03.09 10.10.10-28.05.11 
Spain 27.09.04-31.01.05 25.10.06-04.03.07 05.09.08-31.01.09 11.04.11-24.07.11 
Finland 20.09.04-17.12.04 18.09.06-20.12.06 19.09.08-05.02.09 13.09.10-30.12.10 
France 27.11.04-04.03.05 19.09.06-07.04.07 28.09.08-31.01.09 15.10.10-06.04.11 
United Kingdom 27.09.04-16.03.05 05.09.06-14.01.07 01.09.08-19.01.09 31.08.10-28.02.11 
Greece 10.01.05-20.03.05  - 15.07.09–20.11.09 06.05.11-05.07.11 
Croatia  -  - 22.12.08–31.03.09 16.09.11–14.12.11 
Hungary 02.04.05-31.05.05 21.11.06-28.01.07 20.02.09-20.04.09 19.10.10-10.12.10 
Ireland 18.01.05-20.06.05 14.09.06-31.08.07 11.09.09-12.03.10 20.09.11-31.01.12 
Netherlands 11.09.04-19.02.05 16.09.06-18.03.07 08.09.08-28.06.09 27.09.10-02.04.11 
Norway 15.09.04-15.01.05 21.08.06-19.12.06 25.08.08-20.01.09 09.09.10-15.02.11 
Poland 10.10.04-22.12.04 02.10.06-13.12.06 03.11.08-15.02.09 01.10.10-06.02.11 
Portugal 15.10.04-17.03.05 12.10.06-28.02.07 09.10.08-08.03.09 11.10.10-23.03.11 
Russia  - 18.09.06-09.01.07 08.11.08-09.04.09 24.12.10-14.05.11 
Sweden  29.09.04-19.01.05 21.09.06-03.02.07 15.09.08-03.02.09 27.09.10-01.03.11 
Slovenia 18.10.04-30.11.04 18.10.06-04.12.06 20.10.08-20.01.09 20.10.10-31.01.11 
Slovakia 04.10.04-12.12.04 01.12.06-28.02.07 17.11.08-15.02.09 29.10.10-28.02.11 
Ukraine 28.01.05-10.03.05 06.12.06-12.01.07 01.03.09-02.04.09 13.05.11-30.07.11 
Source: http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ 
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Table A2: Unemployment in percentages  
(Total of labor force) 
  2009 2011 March 2013  
Belgium 7.90 7.10 8.20  
Bulgaria 6.80 11.20 12.40  
Switzerland 4.10 4.10 3.20  
Cyprus 5.30 7.70 14.00a  
Czech Republic 6.70 6.70 8.00  
Germany 7.70 5.90 5.40  
Denmark 6.00 7.60 4.40  
Estonia 13.80 12.50 9.30  
Spain 18.00 21.60 27.20  
Finland 8.20 7.70 9.00  
France 9.10 9.30 10.60b  
United Kingdom 7.70 7.80 7.90a  
Greece 12.5 17.70 27.20  
Croatia 11.8 13.40 21.60  
Hungary 10.00 10.90 11.80  
Ireland  13.5 14.40 14.00c  
Netherlands 3.40 4.40 8.10  
Norway 3.20 3.30 3.50c  
Poland 8.20 9.60 14.30  
Portugal 9.50 12.70 16.90b  
Russia 8.40 6.60 5.70  
Sweden 8.30 7.50 8.80  
Slovenia 5.90 8.20 13.60a  
Slovakia 12.10 13.50 14.70  
Ukraine 8.70 7.90 8.10b  
Numbers marked in red indicate increase in 
unemployment from 2009 to 2011, and red in 2013 
indicates increase from 2011 to 2013, For Croatia, 
Greece, Ireland and Ukraine it is used 2010 levels 
instead of 2009, This is because of the ESS collection 
periods. a Unemployment rate per February 2013   
b Unemployment rate per December 2012  
c Unemployment rate per April 2013, Data for 2009 and 
2011 is downloaded from http://databank.worldbank 
.org/ and data for 2013 is maid available through 
tradingeconomics.com  
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Inflation (Yearly in percent) 
 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Belgium 1.59 2.78 1.82 -0.05 
Bulgaria 2.16 5.04 8.40 2.75 
Croatia 1.77 3.34 2.87 1.05 
Cyprus 4.14 2.56 2.37 0.37 
Czech Republic 0.11 1.85 2.93 1.04 
Denmark 2.09 1.81 1.71 1.33 
Estonia 1.34 4.09 6.60 -0.08 
Finland 0.88 0.86 2.51 0.00 
France 2.11 1.74 1.49 0.09 
United Kingdom 1.36 2.05 2.32 2.17 
Germany 1.04 1.56 2.29 0.31 
Greece 3.53 3.55 2.90 4.71 
Hungary 4.65 3.55 7.94 4.21 
Ireland 3.48 2.43 4.05 -0.95 
Netherlands 2.11 1.67 1.61 1.19 
Norway 2.48 1.52 0.73 2.17 
Poland 0.79 2.11 2.39 3.83 
Portugal 3.28 2.29 2.81 -0.83 
Russia 13.68 12.68 9.01 11.65 
Slovakia 8.55 2.71 2.76 1.62 
Slovenia 5.58 2.48 3.61 0.86 
Spain 3.04 3.37 2.79 -0.29 
Sweden 1.93 0.45 2.21 -0.49 
Switzerland 0.64 1.17 0.73 -0.48 
Ukraine 5.18 13.57 12.84 9.38 
For Croatia, Greece, Ireland and Ukraine it is used 
2010 levels instead of 2009, and for Ireland in 2007 
it is used 2008 levels of inflation. This is because of 
the ESS collection periods. Numbers marked in red 
indicate a deviation from the countries inflation 
target. Numbers marked in blue indicate less than 1 
percent deviation from the target. 
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Figure A6: Mean values POLITICAL TRUST and GDP GROSS DEBT LEVEL, 2004 – 2008 
 
 
 
Figure A7: Mean values of POLITICAL TRUST and GDP GROSS DEBT LEVEL, 2010 
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Figure A8: Mean values of POLITICAL TRUST and GDP GROSS DEBT LEVEL, 2004 -2010 
 
 
Table A4: Correlation between HOW SATISFIED WITH STATE OF ECONOMY IN COUNTRYa and 
the macroeconomic indicators measuring level 
  
GDP growth 
level 
GDP Per Capita 
level 
Unemployment 
level 
GDP gross debt 
level 
How satisfied with present state 
of economy in country .056  .623  -.406 -.126 
N = 149,640 a the measure is aggregated to country-year level for this purpose 
 
Table A5: Correlation between HOW SATISFIED WITH STATE OF ECONOMY IN COUNTRYa 
and the macroeconomic indicators measuring change 
  GDP growth 
change 
GDP per capita 
change 
Unemployment 
change 
GDP gross debt 
change   
How satisfied with present 
state of economy in country .145 .424  -.161 -.198 
N = 149,640 a the measure is aggregated to country-year level for this purpose 
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Table A6: Testing for multicollinearity                       Tolerance 
How satisfied with present state of economy in country (aggregated) .323 
GDP gross debt level        .602 
Unemployment level         .654 
GDP per capita level         .262 
GDP growth level        .321 
Age Squared         .030 
Age          .030 
2008          .249 
2006          .343 
2004          .377 
Education         .748 
Feeling about household income nowadays     .774 
Political interest        .831 
Voted last national election       .888 
Unemployed         .956 
Woman         .973 
 
 
Table A7: Testing for multicollinearity          Tolerance  
How satisfied with present state of economy in country (aggregated) .577 
GDP growth change        .296 
GDP per capita change       .363 
Unemployment change       .479 
GDP gross debt change       .479 
Age Squared         .030 
Age          .030 
2008          .137 
2006          .193 
2004          .195 
Education         .752 
Feeling about household income nowadays     .790 
Political interest        .833 
Voted last national election       .894 
Unemployed         .959 
Woman         .974 
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Figure A9: Testing for curvilinear effect on age
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Appendix B: Scale Construction of Political Trust 
 
Table B2: Rotated Component Matrixa 
    1 2 
Trust in politicians .881 
 Trust in political parties .865 
 Trust in country's parliament .840 
 Trust in the legal system .739 
 Trust in the police .609 .359 
How satisfied with the national government .580 .502 
State of education in country nowadays 
 
.741 
State of health services in country nowadays 
 
.719 
How satisfied with life as a whole 
 
.678 
How satisfied with present state of economy in country .431 .643 
How satisfied with the way democracy works in country .539 .580 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
a Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
 
Table B3: Reliability analysis 
Reliability statistics 
Chronbach's Alpha 0.911 
N 3 
 
 
Table B1: Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
  Total Variance Cumulative Total Variance Cumulative Total Variance Cumulative  
Component 1 5.908 53.713 53.713 5.908 53.713 53.713 4.080 37.088 37.088 
Component 2 1.082 9.832 63.546 1.082 9.832 63.546 2.910 26.458 63.546 
Component 3 .804 7.306 70.851 
      Component 4 .755 6.864 77.716 
      Component 5 .567 5.151 82.867 
      Component 6 .456 4.148 87.015 
      Component 7 .402 3.658 90.673 
      Component 8 .326 2.967 93.640 
      Component 9 .317 2.882 96.522 
      Component 10 .258 2.341 98.863 
      Component 11 .125 1.137 100.000             
Each component loading less than 0.35 has been deleted from the table.  KMO that is a measure on homogeneity in the 
variables has a value of 0.909. Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Variance and Cumulative are both in percent. 
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Appendix C: Sensitivity models excluded from the analysis  
Table C1: Including HOW SATISFIED WITH STATE OF ECONOMY IN COUNTRY. Random intercept model with 
three levels: individual, country-year and country. Dependent variable: POLITICAL TRUST 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 
Constant 4.935*** 4.764*** 4.745*** 2.860*** 4.907*** 4.361*** 2.708*** 
(.338) (.367) (.395) (.451) (.525) (.596) (.680) 
Level-1 
       How satisfied with present state 
of economy in country 
1.131*** 1.131*** 1.131*** 1.131*** 1.131*** 1.131*** 1.131*** 
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Political interest 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.221*** 1.221*** 1.221*** 1.221*** 
(.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) 
Voted last national electiona 1.122*** 1.122*** 1.122*** 1.122*** 1.122*** 1.122*** 1.122*** (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) 
Unemployedb .082 .082 .082 .082 .082 .082 .082 (.071) (.071) (.071) (.071) (.071) (.071) (.071) 
Feeling about household's income 
nowadays 
.107*** .106*** .106*** .105*** .105*** .105*** .105*** 
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
Education .008* .008* .008* .008* .008* .008* .008* (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Womanc .492*** .492*** .492*** .492*** .492*** .492*** .492*** 
(.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) 
Age  -.087***  -.087***  -.087***  -.087***  -.087***  -.087***  -.087*** (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Age squared .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Time control 
       
2004d 
 
.312 .346 .939*** .305 .365 .938*** 
 
(.246) (.356) (.269) (.248) (.254) (.359) 
2006d 
 
 -.207  -.170 .106  -.216  -.155 .109 
 
(.242) (.370) (.247) (.245) (.250) (.367) 
2008d  
.535** .574 .453** .497** .605** .469 
 
(.232) (.383) (.231) (.254) (.246) (.388) 
Level 2 
       GDP growth level   
-.005 
   
.002 
  
(.036) 
   
(.036) 
GDP per Capita levele     
.061*** 
  
.060*** 
   
(.011) 
  
(.013) 
Unemployment level     
 -.016 
 
.000 
    
(.044) 
 
(.045) 
GDP gross debt level      
.007 .003 
     
(.009) (.008) 
Random part          
Var (eijk) 
27.057 27.057 27.057 27.057 27.057 27.057 27.057 
(.100) (.100) (.100) (.100) (.100) (.100) (.100) 
Var (u0jk) 
.766 .654 .655 .646 .661 .657 .641 
(.134) (.115) (.116) (.114) (.118) (.116) (.114) 
Var (v0k)  
2.258 2.315 2.301 .982 2.235 2.209 .994 
(.704) (.711) (.715) (.333) (.724) (.687) (.343) 
   Log Likelihood -451975 -451970 -451970 -451960 -451970 -451969 -451960 
 - 2LL change 
35572*** 
 
  10.26** 
 
10.28** 
0.02 
30.21*** 
19.95*** 
10.39** 
0.13 
10.96** 
0.70 
30.43*** 
20.16*** 
a reference category did not vote last national election b reference category employed, unemployed not looking for a job, permanently sick 
or disabled, retired, homemakers, under education, community or military service and others, c reference category men, d reference 
category 2010, e The variable is divided by 1000, N: Level-3: 25, Level-2: 93, Level-1: 147,256, Standard errors in parentheses, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Model 3 through 7 is tested against Model 1 and 2, also -2LL change for Model 7 is tested against Model 3: 
20.15***, Model 4: 0.22, Model 5: 20.04*** and, Model 6: 19.46*** 
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Table C2: Including HOW SATISFIED WITH STATE OF ECONOMY IN COUNTRY. Random intercept 
model with three levels: individual, country-year and country. Dependent variable: POLITICAL TRUST 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 4.935*** 4.764*** 5.065*** 4.744*** 4.600*** 4.648*** 4.965*** 
(0.338) (0.367) (0.442) (0.372) (0.379) (0.389) (0.490) 
Level-1 
       How satisfied with present 
state of economy in country 
1.131*** 1.131*** 1.131*** 1.131*** 1.131*** 1.131*** 1.131*** 
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Political interest 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) 
Voted last national electiona 1.122*** 1.122*** 1.122*** 1.122*** 1.122*** 1.122*** 1.122*** (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) 
Unemployedb .082 .082 .082 .082 .082 .082 .082 (.071) (.071) (.071) (.071) (.071) (.071) (.071) 
Feeling about household's 
income nowadays 
.107*** .107*** .107*** .107*** .107*** .107*** .107*** 
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
Education .008* .008* .008* .008* .008* .008* .008* (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Womanc 0.492*** 0.492*** 0.492*** 0.492*** 0.492*** 0.492*** 0.492*** (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) 
Age -.087*** -.087*** -.087*** -.087*** -.087*** -.087*** -.087*** (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Age squared .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Time control 
       2004d  
.312 .002 .415 .463* .432 .034 
 
(.246) (.353) (.318) (.269) (.279) (.503) 
2006d  
 -.207  -.536  -.115  -.018  -.056  -.457 
 
(.242) (.362) (.302) (.279) (.293) (.513) 
2008d  
.535** .206 .649** .825*** .693** .394 
 
(.232) (.355) (.322) (.315) (.289) (.536) 
Level-2 
       GDP growth change   
.036 
   
.047 
  
(.030) 
   
(.034) 
GDP per capita changee    
-.015 
  
.008 
   
(.029) 
  
(.031) 
Unemployment change     
.074 
 
.089 
    
(.055) 
 
(.061) 
GDP gross debt change      
.012  -.000 
     
(.014) (.015) 
Random part           
Var (eijk)  
 27.057  27.057  27.057  27.057  27.057  27.057  27.057 
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
Var (u0jk) 
 .766 .654  .639  .645 .650 .646 .635 
(.134) (.115)   .113  (.114) (.115) (.114) (.114) 
Var (v0k) 
 2.258  2.315  2.322   2.382   2.182 2.318 2.129 
(.704)  (.711)    (.712) (.742) (.680)  (.711) (.684) 
Log Likelihood -451975 -451970 -451969 -451970 -451969 -451969 -451968 
 - 2LL change 
35562*** 
 
10.26** 
 
11.71** 
1.45 
10.51** 
0.24 
12.06** 
1.79 
11.07** 
0.81 
14.17** 
3.90 
a Reference category did not vote last national election, b reference category employed, unemployed not looking for a job, 
permanently sick or disabled, retired, homemakers, under education, community or military service and others, c dummy variable 
with reference category men, d reference category 2010, e The variable is divided by 1000, N: Level-3: 25, Level-2: 93, Level-1: 
147,256, Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Model 3 through 7 is tested against both Model 1 and 2, 
also -2LL for Model 7 is tested against Model 3: 2.45, Model 4: 3.66, Model 5: 2.11 and Model 6: 3.09 
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Table C3: Random intercept model with three levels: individual, country-year and country.  
Dependent variable: TRUST IN COUNTRY’S PARLIAMENT 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 3.445*** 3.252*** 3.402*** 2.005*** 3.930*** 3.678*** 2.773*** (.197) (.211) (.231) (.236) (.284) (.352) (.357) 
Level-1 
       Political interest .422*** .422*** .422*** .421*** .422*** .422*** .421*** (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Voted last national electiona .524*** .524*** .524*** .524*** .524*** .524*** .524*** (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Unemployedb  -.186***  -.185***  -.185***  -.186***  -.185***  -.185***  -.185*** 
(.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) 
Feeling about household’s 
income nowadays 
.206*** .206*** .206*** .206*** .206*** .206*** .206*** 
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Education .031*** .031*** .031*** .031*** .031*** .031*** .031*** 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Womanc .020* .020* .020* .020* .020* .020* .020* 
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) 
Age  -.045***  -.045***  -.045***  -.045***  -.045***  -.045***  -.045*** 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Age squared .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Time control 
       2004d  
.328** .063 .736*** .292** .271* .436** 
 
(.141) (.197) (.152) (.136) (.141) (.193) 
2006d  
.309** .021 .517*** .265** .254* .188 
 
(.138) (.204) (.142) (.134) (.138) (.197) 
2008d  
.179  -.133 .126  -.001 .105  -.299 
 
(.132) (.211) (.133) (.139) (.137) (.209) 
Level-2 
       GDP growth level 
  
.037* 
   
.034* 
   
(.0198) 
   
(.019) 
GDP per capita level 
   
.040*** 
  
.039*** 
    
(.006) 
  
(.007) 
Unemployment level 
    
-.078*** 
 
 -.041* 
     
(.024) 
 
(.024) 
GDP gross debt level 
     
-.008  -.005 
      
(.005) (.004) 
Random part           
Var (eijk) 
4.943 4.943 4.943 4.943 4.943 4.943 4.943 
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
Var (u0jk) 
.238  .216 .201  .218 .201  .202  .189 
(.041) (.038) (.035)  (.038) (.035)  (.036)  (.033) 
Var (v0k)  
.845  .832 .903 .252  .672  .930  .261 
 (.259) (.254)  (.275)  (.090)  (.210) (.294)  (.091) 
Log Likelihood -332123 -332120 -332118 -332107 -332115 -332119 -332102 
 -2LL change 
8899*** 
 
6.87* 
 
10.05** 
3.18* 
32.50*** 
25.63*** 
16.81*** 
9.95*** 
8.97*  
2.11 
42.01*** 
35.15*** 
a reference category did not vote last national election, b reference category employed, unemployed not looking for a job, permanently 
sick or disabled, retired, homemakers, under education, community or military service and others, c reference category men, d 
reference category 2010, e The variable is divided by 1000, N: Level-3: 25, Level-2: 93, Level-1:149,640, Standard errors in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Model 3 through 7 is tested against both Model 1 and 2, also -2LL change for Model 7 is 
tested against Model 3: 28.67***, Model 4:10.34**, Model 5: 21.98*** and Model 6: 29.14*** 
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Table C4: Random intercept model with three levels: individual- country-year and country. 
Dependent variable: TRUST IN POLITICIANS 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 2.873*** 2.745*** 2.872*** 1.676*** 3.280*** 3.080*** 2.351*** 
 
(.181) (.191) (.206) (.219) (.246) (.304) (.311) 
Level-1 
       
Political interest .435*** .435*** .435*** .435*** .435*** .435*** .435*** (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Voted last national electiona .444*** .444*** .444*** .444*** .443*** .444*** .444*** (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
Unemployedb  -.139***  -.138***  -.138***  -.138***  -.138***  -.138***  -.138*** (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) 
Feeling about household's 
income nowadays 
.192*** .192*** .192*** .192*** .192*** .192*** .192*** 
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Education .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Womanc .167*** .167*** .167*** .167*** .167*** .167*** .167*** (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) 
Age  -.043***  -.043***  -.043***  -.043***  -.043***  -.043***  -.043*** (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Age squared .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Time control 
       
2004d  
.228** .006 .581*** .200* .184 .324** 
 
(.114) (.160) (.129) (.112) (.116) (.163) 
2006d  
.200*  -.041 .379*** .166 .157 .100 
 
(.112) (.166) (.117) (.110) (.114) (.166) 
2008d  
.113  -.149 .067  -.029 .0549  -.300* 
 
(.108) (.172) (.110) (.114) (.112) (.176) 
Level-2 
       
GDP growth level   
.031* 
   
.029* 
  
(.016) 
   
(.016) 
GDP per capita level    
.034*** 
  
.034*** 
   
(.006) 
  
(.006) 
Unemployment level     
-.062*** 
 
 -.036* 
    
(.020) 
 
(.021) 
GDP gross debt level      
-.006  -.004 
     
(.004) (.004) 
Random part  
       
Var (eijk) 
 4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250  4.250 
 (.016)  (.016)  (.016)  (.016)  (.016)  (.016)  (.016) 
Var (u0jk) 
.152  .142 .132 .147  .134 .135  .132 
( .027)  (.025)  (.023) (.026)  (.024) (.024) (.023) 
Var (v0k)  
 .722 .713  .760 .246  .575  .759 .220 
(.217) (.214)  (.227) (.084) (.178) (.231) (.076) 
Log Likelihood -320812 -320810 -320808 -320799 -320806 -320809 -320794 
 -2LL change 
8653*** 
 
4.83 
 
8.25* 
3.42* 
26.43*** 
21.59*** 
13.77*** 
8.94*** 
6.77  
1.94 
36.72*** 
31.89*** 
a reference category did not vote last national election, b reference category employed, unemployed not looking for a job, 
permanently sick or disabled, retired, homemakers under education, community or military service and others, c reference 
category men, d reference category 2010, e The variable is divided by 1000, N: Level-3: 25, Level-2: 93, Level-1: 149,640, 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Model 3 through 7 is tested against both Model 1 and 2, also -
2LL change for Model 7 is tested against Model 3: 28.47***, Model 4:10.30**, Model 5: 22.95*** and, Model 6: 29.95*** 
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Table C5: Random intercept model with three levels: individual, country-year and country. 
Dependent variable: TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Constant 3.277*** 3.135*** 3.242*** 2.087*** 3.652*** 3.482*** 2.756*** (.180) (.189) (.202) (.216) (.237) (.294) (.301) 
Level-1 
       Political interest .473*** .473*** .473*** .472*** .473*** .472*** .472*** (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Voted last national 
electiona 
.461*** .460*** .461*** .461*** .460*** .461*** .461*** 
(.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
Unemployedb  -.105***  -.105***  -.105***  -.105***  -.104***  -.105***  -.104*** (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) 
Feeling about household's 
income nowadays 
.172*** .172*** .171*** .171*** .172*** .171*** .171*** 
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Education  -.006***  -.006***  -.006***  -.006***  -.006***  -.006***  -.006*** (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Womanc .142*** .142*** .142*** .142*** .142*** .142*** .142*** (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) 
Age  -.053***  -.053***  -.053***  -.053***  -.053***  -.053***  -.053*** (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Age squared .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Time control 
       2004d  
.234** .046 .582*** .207** .188* .358** 
 
(.107) (.151) (.122) (.104) (.108) (.155) 
2006d  
.229** .025 .403*** .195* .184* .163 
 
(.105) (.157) (.111) (.103) (.106) (.157) 
2008d  
.134  -.087 .089  -.003 .074  -.236 
 
(.101) (.162) (.103) (.107) (.105) (.166) 
Level-2 
       GDP growth level   
.026* 
   
.024 
  
(.015) 
   
(.015) 
GDP per capita level    
.034*** 
  
.033*** 
   
(.006) 
  
(.006) 
Unemployment level      
-.060*** 
 
 -.037* 
    
(.019) 
 
(.020) 
GDP gross debt level      
-.006  -.004 
     
(.004) (.003) 
Random part 
       
Var (eijk) 
 4.126  4.126  4.126  4.126  4.126   4.126  4.126 
(.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
Var (u0jk) 
 .136   .124  .117  .130  .116  .118  .117 
 (.024) (.022) (.021)   (.023)  (.021) (.021) (.021) 
Var (v0k)  
.720  .712 .750  .250  .576 .755  .217 
 (.215) (.212) (.223) (.083) (.176)  (.227)  (.074) 
Log Likelihood -318601 -318598 -318596 -318587 -318593 -318596 -318582 
 -2LL 
9412*** 
 
6.26* 
 
9.04* 
2.78* 
27.37*** 
21.11*** 
15.73*** 
9.47*** 
8.57*  
2.30 
37.71*** 
31.45*** 
a reference category did not vote last national election, b reference category employed, unemployed not looking for a job, 
permanently sick or disabled, retired, homemakers, under education, community or military service and others, c reference 
category men, d reference category 2010, e The variable is divided by 1000, N: Level-3: 25, Level-2: 93, Level-1: 149,640, 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Model 3 - 7 is tested against both Model 1 and 2, also -2LL for 
Model 7 is tested against Model 3: 28.67***, Model 4:10.34**, Model 5: 21.98*** and Model 6: 29.14*** 
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Table C4: Including INFLATION LEVEL. Random intercept model with three levels: 
individual, country-year and country. Dependent variable: POLITICAL TRUST 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 9.462*** 8.155*** (.616) (.948) 
Level-1  
  Political interest 1.329*** 1.329*** (.018) (.018) 
Voted last national electiona 1.427*** 1.428*** (.039) (.039) 
Unemployedb  -.428***  -.428*** (.077) (.077) 
Feeling about household's income nowadays .570*** .569*** (.020) (.020) 
Education .027*** .027*** (.004) (.004) 
Womanc .329*** .329*** (.030) (.030) 
Age  -.141***  -.141*** (.005) (.005) 
Age squared .001*** .001*** (.000) (.000) 
Time control 
  2004d .740** 1.025** (.356) (.497) 
2006d .574 .235 (.367) (.521) 
2008d .271 -1.037* (.350) (.547) 
Level-2 
  GDP Growth level 
 
.094* 
  
(.049) 
GDP per Capita levele 
 
.107*** 
  
(.017) 
Unemployment level 
 
 -.103* 
  
(.062) 
GDP Gross Debt level 
 
 -.013 
  
(.011) 
Inflation levelf -.483  -.497 
 
(.334) (.308) 
Random part     
Var (eijk) 
32.223 32.223 
(.118) (.118) 
Var (u0jk) 
1.372 1.221 
(.239) (.215) 
Var (v0k)  
6.390 1.920 
(1.927) (.662) 
Log Likelihood -472389 -472371 
 -2LL change 
8.20* 
2.07  35.20***  
a reference category did not vote last national election, b  reference category employed, unemployed not looking for a job, 
permanently sick or disabled, retired, homemakers under education, community or military service and others, c dummy 
variable with reference category men, d reference category 2010, e The variable is divided by 1000,  f Inflation is a dummy 
variable measuring inflation below or above more than one percent from inflation target (1), while reference + / - 1 
percent from inflation level (0), N: Level-3: 25, Level-2: 93, Level-1: 149,640, Standard errors in parentheses, *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Model 1 is tested against Model 1 and 2 in the main analysis, while Model 2 is tested against 
Model 1, where inflation is added. 
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Table C5: Including INFLATION CHANGE. Random intercept model with three levels: 
individual, country-year and country. Dependent variable: POLITICAL TRUST 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 8.971*** 10.24*** (.588) (.752) 
Level-1 
  Political interest 1.329*** 1.329*** 
(.018) (.018) 
Voted last national electiona 1.427*** 1.428*** (.039) (.039) 
Unemployedb  -.428***  -.427*** (.077) (.077) 
Feeling about household's income nowadays .570*** .570*** (.020) (.020) 
Education .027*** .027*** (.004) (.004) 
Womanc .329*** .329*** 
(.030) (.030) 
Age  -.141***  -.141*** (.005) (.005) 
Age squared .001*** .001*** (.000) (.000) 
Time control  
  2004d .947** -.431 (.372) (.713) 
2006e .903**  -.676 (.368) (.722) 
2008f .625*  -1.190 (.363) (.750) 
Level-2 
  GDP Growth change  
.072 
 
(.048) 
GDP per Capita changeg  
.018 
 
(.043) 
Unemployment change  
 -.151* 
 
(.085) 
GDP gross Debt change  
 -.040* 
 
(.021) 
Inflation change -.088  -.124* (.064) (.064) 
Random part     
Var (eijk) 
32.223 32.223 
(.118) (.118) 
Var (u0jk) 
1.367 1.108 
(.238) (.196) 
Var (v0k)  
6.500 6.779 
(1.953) (2.063) 
Log Likelihood -472389 -472382 
 -2LL change 
 8.04* 
1.91 
13.27*** 
  
a reference category did not vote last national election, b reference category employed, unemployed not looking for a job, 
permanently sick or disabled, retired, homemakers under education, community or military service and others, c dummy 
variable with reference category men, d   reference category 2010, e The variable is divided by 1000, N: Level-3: 25, Level 
2: 93, Level-1: 149,640, Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Model 1 is tested against Model 
1 and 2 in the main analysis, while Model 2 is tested against Model 1, where inflation is added. 	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Table C6: Random intercept model with three levels: individual, country-year and 
country. Dependent variable: POLITICAL TRUST. Mediterranean countries. 
  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 7.336*** 13.48*** 10.52*** 13.07*** 
 
(.924) (2.676) (1.605) (2.161) 
Level-1 
    
Political interest 1.718*** 1.718*** 1.718*** 1.718*** 
(.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) 
Voted last national election .706*** .707*** .707*** .707*** 
(.102) (.102) (.102) (.102) 
Unemployed  -.349*  -.352*  -.351*  -.353* 
(.181) (.181) (.181) (.181) 
Feeling about household's income nowadays .356*** .356*** .355*** .354*** 
(.048) (.048) (.048) (.048) 
Education  -.018*  -.018*  -.018*  -.018* 
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
Woman .489*** .489*** .489*** .489*** 
(.077) (.077) (.077) (.077) 
Age  -.070***  -.070***  -.070***  -.070*** 
(.013) (.013) (.013) (.013) 
Age squared .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Level-2 
    
GDP growth level .437***    (.060) 
   
GDP per capita level  
 -.229** 
  
 
(.094) 
  
Unemployment level   
 -.306** 
 
  
(.149) 
 
GDP gross debt level    
 -.072*** 
   
(.027) 
Random part  
    
Var (eijk)  32.335  32.335  32.335  32.335 (.302) (.302) (.302) (.302) 
Var (u0jk)   .503  1.809  2.366   2.046  (.234)  (.833) (1.062)   (.954) 
Var (v0k)   2.789  6.677  2.752  2.416 (2.095) (5.365) (2.427) (2.340) 
Log Likelihood -72416 -72424 -72424 -72423 
 - 2LL change 15.87*** 12.62*** 5.51** 1.96 
a reference category did not vote last national election, b reference category employed, unemployed not looking for 
a job, permanently sick or disabled, retired, homemakers under education, community or military service and 
others, c dummy variable with reference category men, d   reference category 2010, e The variable is divided by 
1000, N: Level-3: 4, Level 2: 14, Level-1: 22,929, Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.	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Table C7: Random intercept model with three levels: individual, country-year and 
country. Dependent variable: POLITICAL TRUST. Mediterranean countries. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 7.910*** 8.407*** 6.054*** 8.250*** 7.906*** 
 
(1.064) (1.084) (1.031) (1.067) (0.985) 
Level-1 
     
Political interest 1.718*** 1.718*** 1.718*** 1.718*** 1.718*** 
(.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) 
Voted last national election .706*** .706*** .706*** .707*** .706*** 
(.102) (.102) (.102) (.102) (.102) 
Unemployed  -.352*  -.349*  -.349*  -.351*  -.351* 
(.181) (.181) (.181) (.181) (.181) 
Feeling about household's income 
nowadays 
.355*** .356*** .356*** .356*** .356*** 
(.048) (.048) (.048) (.048) (.048) 
Education  -.018*  -.018*  -.018*  -.018*  -.018* 
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
Woman .489*** .489*** .489*** .489*** .489*** 
(.077) (.077) (.077) (.077) (.077) 
Age  -.070***  -.070***  -.070***  -.070***  -.070*** 
(.013) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.013) 
Age squared .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Level-2 
     
GDP growth change  
.364*** 
   
 
(.058) 
   
GDP per capita 1000 change   
.547*** 
  
  
(.114) 
  
Unemployment change    
 -.347*** 
 
   
(.128) 
 
GDP gross debt change     
 -.093 
    
(.064) 
Random part            
Var (eijk)   32.335  32.335  32.335  32.33499  32.335 (.302) (.302) (.302)  (.302) (.302) 
Var (u0jk)   3.204 .632  .988  1.844  2.821 (1.446) (.291) (.452) (.835) (1.283) 
Var (v0k)    3.141  4.038  2.898  3.503  2.604  (2.946)  (2.996) (2.285) (2.886) (2.530) 
Log Likelihood -72425 -72418 -72419 -72423 -72424 
 - 2LL change 2050.73*** 19.50*** 3.40* 3.69* 5.65** 
a reference category did not vote last national election, b reference category employed, unemployed not looking 
for a job, permanently sick or disabled, retired, homemakers under education, community or military service and 
others, c dummy variable with reference category men, d   reference category 2010, e The variable is divided by 
1000, N: Level-3: 4, Level 2: 14, Level-1: 22,929, Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.	  	  
 
 
 
